As you know, the problems of human rights and civil liberties were developed in many countries of the East during their colonial or semi-colonial dependence, more precisely, at the stage of the development of the national liberation struggle. This development was carried out not only from various ideological and political positions, but also in various forms - both secular and religious. Egyptian social thought had a prominent place in appealing to the humanistic traditions of medieval Arab-Muslim philosophy, in responding to the ideas of the European Enlightenment regarding "natural human rights", civil equality and civil liberties.

After the end of World War II, Egypt participated in the preparation of the draft Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) under the auspices of the United Nations. The Egyptian delegation was particularly active in the debate around article 19. The article stated that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, has the right to freely adhere to their beliefs, as well as to seek, receive, disseminate information and ideas by any means, regardless of State borders. The Egyptian delegate noted that such a question could be "seen as encouraging, albeit unintentionally, certain machinations of well-known missions in the East", the purpose of which was to convert the local population. This statement was supported in principle by the representative of Pakistan, who, like his Egyptian colleague, believed that Western missionaries combine the spread of Christianity in the East with aiding the colonialists [see: Zhdanov, 1991, pp. 107-108].

The main provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are reflected in the current Constitution of Egypt in 1971. It is necessary to mention the provisions of this document, according to which the equality of citizens before the law is proclaimed regardless of gender, language, religion and beliefs (Article 40); the personal life of citizens is declared inviolable and protected by law (Article 45), any encroachment on this inviolability, as well as on other personal rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and law, is recognized as a crime The statute of limitations does not apply in criminal and civil proceedings (Article 57); the State guarantees freedom of conscience and religious worship (Article 46); freedom of expression in oral, written and other forms is guaranteed, but within the framework of the law and provided that constructive criticism and self-criticism "are a guarantee of integrity." national structure" (art. 47); freedom of scientific research, literary, artistic and cultural creativity is guaranteed (art. 49), as well as freedom of the press, publications and mass media, although censorship may be introduced in a limited form in a state of emergency or in wartime "in the interests of state integrity and national unity".-

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48); citizens are granted the right "to hold private meetings without prior notice, without disturbing public order and without carrying weapons" (Article 54), as well as the right to form associations in accordance with the law, but their activities should not be directed against the existing system and society, should not be prohibited by law. be conducted in secret and be of a military nature (Article 55).

The social and moral foundations of society include: the duty of the state "to ensure the safety of the Egyptian family, its values and traditions "(Article 9), to guarantee the protection of motherhood and childhood, to take care of the younger generation, creating favorable conditions for the development of their abilities (Article 10); to provide women with the opportunity to combine social work with duties in the family, giving it equal rights with a man in the socio-political, cultural and economic spheres of life in accordance with the norms of Muslim law-Sharia (Article 11). The State has undertaken to guarantee the right to work (Article 159), to provide social, cultural and medical services to the population, especially in rural areas, with a view to improving their standard of living as soon as possible (Article 16); to guarantee the payment of disability, unemployment and old-age pensions (Article 17), as well as the right to education (Article 18). According to the Constitution, "the observance of moral norms and their protection, the development of original Egyptian traditions, care for the development of religious education, moral and national values, the preservation of the historical heritage of the people, scientific data, social norms of behavior and public ethics are the responsibility of society within the framework provided for by law. The State must be guided by these principles and strengthen them" (Article 12) [Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2003, pp. 163-166].

Based on the fact that most of the constitutional provisions on human rights in the light of the realities of the Muslim East were originally, and still are, declarative in nature, some researchers believed that these norms are designed "for growth", for the prospect of their subsequent implementation. However, the path to such a future for Egypt, like many other eastern states, was not straightforward. A departure from the boundaries already taken was evident in the results of the 1980 referendum, when the text of the Egyptian constitution (Article 2) was supplemented with a provision that assigned Islam the status of the state religion, and the "provisions of Muslim law - Sharia" - the status of the basis of legislation [An-Naim, 2002, p.173-174].

This turn of events was immediately reflected in the subsequent process of official recognition by Egypt of international instruments on human rights and civil liberties. If in 1967, for example, without any reservations, the Egyptian side acceded to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, as well as to the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (both acts were ratified in 1982), then the situation was different with the signing of the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1980. on the Elimination of All Forms of discrimination against women, which was ratified a year later. Egypt (along with other States of traditional Islam - Algeria, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, etc.) stipulated that it does not consider itself bound by certain provisions of this international legal act. Regarding the principle of equality of spouses in determining the nationality of a child (Article 2), the Egyptian side noted that such a determination was preferred over the nationality of the father. Concerning the principle of equality of spouses in their family rights and obligations (art. 16) It has been observed that family relations in Egypt have always been regulated by sacred religious institutions. Therefore, the intention to follow the principle of securing for a woman the same rights in family relations as for a man was accompanied by the recognition that in proviso, that is, by virtue of:-

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Given the prevailing conditions, this principle cannot be acceptable for Sharia law [see: Polenina, 2000, pp. 178-179].

When assessing Egypt's position on the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, it is necessary to keep in mind not only the purely legal, but also the factual side of the case. According to this Convention (Article 28), States that signed it had the right to make reservations, i.e. unilateral statements by which the intention to exclude or modify certain provisions of this act was fixed. The reservations made by Egypt were based on Sharia law, from its official recognition as the basis of State legislation. As a result, there was a conflict between the norms of international law and the corresponding provisions of the Egyptian Constitution, on the one hand, and Sharia norms, on the other. But the appeal to sharia was actually based on different approaches to the same problem. In some cases, this approach was determined by a modern vision of the issue while simultaneously taking into account the socio-cultural specifics of the "world of Islam"; in others, it was idealized by early Islamic foundations, which was embodied in attempts to reproduce medieval Muslim practices that were incompatible with the requirements of modernity.

In particular, the trial of the "hisba" claim (i.e., in connection with the violation of religious morality), when Professor Nasr Abu Zayd appeared as a defendant, became very famous in Egypt and abroad. The plaintiffs accused him of "apostasy" and demanded that the defendant divorce his wife. In 1993 the Giza District Court of First Instance did not support this claim. Then the plaintiffs appealed to the Cairo Court of Appeal, and the judges ruled in their favor. In 1995, the Supreme Court issued a final decision on Nasr Abu Zayed's divorce from his wife. A year after this trial, a law was passed requiring the courts to accept claims from individuals in the "hisba" profile [An-Naim, p. 173].

A series of subsequent denunciations of individual Egyptians for "blasphemy" and" apostasy " indicated attempts to effectively negate the constitutional provisions on human rights, based on the recognition of Sharia law as the basis of State legislation. It has also happened that prominent members of the human rights movement have become the target of accusations under the "hisba" profile. For example, Nawal al-Saadawi, a well-known writer and a staunch fighter against the belittled position of a Muslim woman in the family and society, has experienced many anxieties. In 2001, the Islamists denounced her as an "atheist" and tried to arrange her divorce from her husband [Al-Ahram, 21-27 June 2001].

The reaction of the Egyptian public, including the Muslim community, to the facts of the reproduction of medieval religious practices that challenge modern and civilizational approaches to human rights was not uniform and unambiguous. As Egypt, like many other Eastern states, rapidly entered the ascent of the movement for the "revival of Islam" and "return to its fundamental values" from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, opponents of an absolute and strict orientation towards international human rights standards came to the fore. Referring to the" Western origin " of international law, they argued that it was thereby either fully or partially established.

¹ L. R. Syukiyainen drew attention to the direct connection between the features of the modern Islamic view of women's rights and the system of values, the origins of which go back to the Muslim legal culture. According to this system, the main priority is not a comprehensive equality of rights between women and men, but the equality of their opportunities in the enjoyment of their rights, which bear the stamp of differences in family responsibilities. The fulfillment of a woman's family duty is of higher value than the realization of professional and other ambitions [Shukiyainen, 2002, pp. 303-307].

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It is largely incompatible with the original values of the Muslim East. The idea of complete incompatibility was adopted by extremist Islamist groups. Declaring a "holy war in the name of faith" not only to the entire non-Islamic, primarily "Western" world, they accused all non-believers and dissidents of adhering to Jahiliya (i.e., sinful polytheism). The prospect of legal regulation on a global scale was associated exclusively with Sharia law.

A different position was held by that part of the adherents of the "fundamental values of Islam", who saw in their approval the most important prerequisite for the spiritual and moral recovery of Muslim society, the key to effective development of the achievements of modern progress and constructive dialogue with the world community on a cultural and humanitarian basis. Signs that the dialogue will not avoid human rights issues have been evident since the early 1980s. In 1981, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights was published, developed by the Islamic Council of Europe, a non-governmental organization that unites people from the Muslim East, including Egypt. In 1990, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam was adopted by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which coordinates at the intergovernmental level the activities of many States with Muslim populations. In terms of their content, both declarations were an "Islamic" response to international human rights standards, marked both by the recognition of the universality of these standards and by a special emphasis on the historical and cultural identity of the" world of Islam " [see: Kovler, 2002, p. 235-244; Shukiyainen, 2002, pp. 307-314]. This kind of specific approach distinguished the speeches of representatives of a Muslim group of states (Iran, Syria, Yemen, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt and others) at the UN World Conference on Human Rights (1993).

Meanwhile, along with the "Islamic" development of the concept of human rights, various militant Islamist groups have become more active. The terror unleashed by them in a number of countries in the Muslim East, including Egypt, has created a dilemma that is still very significant for the socio-political life of these countries, including for local human rights movements. The Egyptian situation is still largely determined by the introduction of martial law after an extremist group made an attempt on the life of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981, as a result of which he was killed. New President Hosni Mubarak at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers stressed that his first priority is to restore political stability in the country, even if it means restricting democratic freedoms.

Having a tough and implacable opponent in the face of Islamic extremists, who are adept at organizing an extensive and deeply secret underground, relying on the powerful support of like-minded foreign people, the Egyptian authorities sought to keep the situation in the country under their control. The crackdown on militant Islamists did not preclude the release from prison of those who expressed a willingness to end their previous subversive activities. Military methods of struggle were supplemented by the use of various political and legal methods designed to weaken, if not block, the Islamist opposition [see: Razhbadinov, 2004; Esposito, 2003, p. 84-86].

Most importantly, in the most difficult conditions of martial law, which objectively limited public initiative and self-activity, it was the state that from the end of the XX - beginning of the XXI century began to take the initiative to bring not only organizational and legal, but also socio-cultural norms to the movement for the protection of human rights and civil liberties.

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In 1999, the authorities attempted to legislate on the activities of numerous human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The focus of the law adopted at that time was largely determined by the fact that it was developed as a response of the ruling circles to the very chaotic state of the human rights movement, with the dominant activity of those participants whose efforts were limited to recording facts of human rights violations by the state security and justice authorities during the implementation of law enforcement measures, including actions directed against Islamic extremists.

The desire of many Egyptian NGOs to fight against the use of torture during investigative investigations, against ill-treatment of prisoners in prisons, and so on, by aligning themselves with international human rights standards, by appealing not so much to the local as to the Western public, was often regarded by the authorities as biased criticism, and sometimes as a manifestation of purely oppositional sentiments.

The severity with which the 1999 law on non-governmental organizations regulated and restricted their activities could not but cause protest from the general public. Realizing how unpredictable the intensification of opposition activities can be, the Egyptian authorities have tried to shift the focus of non-governmental organizations to constructive solutions to problems that are vital for the state and society. And first of all-to eliminate the belittled position of women in the family and in society, the consequences of which increasingly slowed down the modernization of the state and social structure, the rise of the economy and culture.

To begin with, with the exception of a thin stratum of educated Egyptian women who are included in the orbit of modern life, most of their compatriots live in the world of traditional Sharia regulation of personal status and family relations. Accordingly, the belittled position of women is cultivated, and its slight increase is provided only by the birth of children, primarily boys. There is a direct link between the predominance of the patriarchal-traditional type of family in the Egyptian family structure, its attitude to having many children, and the persistence of pre-capitalist economic methods, especially in rural areas. Meanwhile, by the end of the twentieth century, Egypt, along with a number of other developing countries, found itself in a dead end situation: the rapid pace of uncontrolled population growth actually negated the already quite modest achievements in the country's economic development. The acuteness of the demographic problem was reflected in the processes of agricultural overpopulation, superurbanization, rising unemployment, etc.

By including the "women's issue" in the agenda of Egyptian public and political life, the authorities responded to its fateful significance for the country. What is no less significant-they got a real chance to channel the energy of various social forces with different ideological and ideological attitudes in the general direction of constructive patriotic and humanitarian activities. In turn, combining the efforts of participants in the struggle for women's rights could not but increase the dynamism and effectiveness of the entire movement for human rights and civil liberties. This purposefully created an effective counterbalance to the threats to political stability in the country, and finally to the power structures themselves, which came from the militant Islamic opposition.

The understanding that the outcome of the confrontation depends not only on the effectiveness of power and other anti-extremist actions, but also on the position of a large mass of Muslims who are committed to the ideals of "reviving Islam" in its traditional ethical and legal parameters, aimed the ruling circles of Egypt at flexibility

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and maneuverability in the psychological support of their policies. This was manifested primarily in taking into account such properties of mass consciousness as the rejection of innovations, which goes back to their canonical prohibition (bid); in particular sensitivity to the moral justification of normative acts in the light of the principles of "Islamic justice"; Sharia recognition of "rumor", i.e. public opinion, as a normatively significant factor in social regulation.

There is a certain logic in the sequence of state actions, including legislative ones, aimed at raising the status of women in the family and society, and in the variability of official measures to weaken and block real and possible actions of the Islamic traditionalist opposition. The need for such measures was fully identified during the drafting of the 2000 law, which equated the rights of spouses to take the initiative in divorce proceedings, and the 2003 law on determining the citizenship of a child by both the citizenship of an Egyptian father and the citizenship of an Egyptian mother. Indeed, in both cases, the legislator violated the fundamental principles of Sharia law in the field of family law: in the first case, the centuries-old tradition of securing the initiative in divorce mainly for the husband was violated, in the second case, the principle of patrilineality inherent in Sharia law was deprived of full legal force.

When drafting and discussing the 2000 law, the authorities tried to present this act as directly related to Sharia, or rather, to the norms of "hulu", which allowed the wife to leave her husband on the basis of" muawad", i.e. in accordance with the Sharia principle of"exchange of rights and property". The essence of "hulu" was that the wife received the right to divorce the marriage in exchange for the monetary reward of the spouse.

According to the 2000 law, the "hulu" procedure could be not only the initial, but also the final stage of the divorce process, if the divorcing couples agreed to limit themselves to it. If after one month allotted for this procedure, the husband insisted on preserving the marriage, then the wife had the right to file a divorce claim with the court. The court could have decided in her favor. However, the decision was made on the condition that the divorced spouse refused material support on the part of the former husband and returned the marriage ransom (mahr) to him. The time limit for making a court decision on childless couples should not exceed three months, and for spouses with many children - no more than six months [Law N 1/2000..., 2000, p. 15].

At the stage of preparation, promulgation and entry into force, the law has consistently provoked heated debates and clashes between representatives of various sectors of Egyptian society. Even the faculty of Al-Azhar, the oldest and most highly authoritative university in the world of Islam, has been split into opposing factions. Yehya Ismail, the general secretary of the Al-Azhar Ulema Front (which included many faculty members known for their theological scholarship), published an article titled "Hulu: Made in America." In it, he denounced Sheikh Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi, the head of Al-Azhar, for supporting the law on granting women the right to divorce, presenting the case that the adoption of the law is the result of American diktat. In response, Sheikh Tantawi sent a complaint to the Prosecutor General, who put Yehya Ismail on trial for defamation. In March 2001, the Cairo Criminal Court acquitted the defendant, noting that his article contained "purely critical comments". Six months later, the Court of Cassation reviewed the fait accompli procedure, considering it necessary to transfer the case to another criminal court. This time, a decision was issued (August 2002), according to which Yehya Ismail was subject to a one-year prison sentence for defamation of Sheikh Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi. This decision was immediately protested by the Legal Aid Center for Human Rights. By reaching out to other Egyptian non-governmental human rights organizations,-

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In addition, the Center suggested joining efforts to eliminate penalties in the form of imprisonment or fines for actions related to expressing personal opinion. This position was supported by reference to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which Egypt ratified [Al-Ahram Weekly, 29.08-4.09.2002].

The implementation of the 2000 law, which was intended to establish the equality of spouses in the right to terminate marriage, was initially hindered by a conservative part of the judicial corps: the time frame for considering divorce cases initiated by women was artificially delayed, they were subjected to humiliating questions, etc. ². To correct this situation, in March 2004 the Egyptian People's Assembly decided to create special courts for family cases. business matters. In addition to three judges, a sociologist and a psychologist should work in each of the courts. They are assigned the role of intermediaries and advisers in resolving family problems and conflicts. Prior to the adoption of the parliamentary decision, the idea of establishing family courts was approved by the Mufti as the country's highest spiritual authority on Muslim law, the Minister of the Interior, and the National Council for Women's Affairs, which functions as a specialized advisory body under the President of the country [Al-Ahram Weekly, 25-31.03.2004].

Taking into account the considerable heat of passion that raged around the 2000 law on granting women the right to divorce, the Egyptian authorities spent a relatively long time and intensively preparing public opinion to ensure that the law on determining citizenship not only on the paternal but also on the maternal side was perceived by the majority of the population with due understanding, calmly and without

The law was initiated by the President of Egypt. During a speech at the congress of the ruling National Democratic Party in September 2002, Hosni Mubarak proposed to reconsider the previous approach to determining citizenship exclusively on the paternal side. Responding to this statement, the Minister of the Interior established a committee to draft the relevant draft law, which included representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, the National Council for Women's Affairs, as well as a group of highly qualified legal experts. The bill was discussed by the National Assembly and was supported by the majority of parliamentarians. The official campaign in favor of making the draft law valid was based not only and not so much on emphasizing its importance for building civil society. Specific facts were put forward in the center of attention: the peace and well-being of 300 thousand Egyptian mothers married to foreigners is under threat. After all, according to the current legislation, they can not count on the fact that their children (numbering approximately one million) become citizens of Egypt [Al-Ahram Weekly. 6 - 12.12.2003]. Such a statement of the question could not but appeal to humane and patriotic feelings, to the tradition of respectful and respectful attitude towards the mother, which is characteristic of universal ethics in general, and of Egyptian culture, including its Islamic component.

Among the official measures that preceded the entry into force of the 2003 law on the new procedure for obtaining citizenship, actions that were logically interrelated with the prospect of building a national mechanism for the protection and observance of human rights stood out. We are talking about both mastering the elements of relevant international experience and changes in the legislation on NGOs.

In the fact that since the beginning of the XXI century, the Egyptian authorities began to actively cooperate with the UN, with other states, giving a systematic character to all human rights activities.-

² During 2000-2003, for example, out of 5,431 lawsuits filed by women for the purpose of divorce, only 222 were granted divorce [The Egyptian Gazette, 11.11.2003].

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In addition, the National Council for Women's Affairs played a major role. Since 1998, he has maintained contacts with the United Nations Development Fund, which specializes in addressing issues of women's equality and participation in various spheres of modern life (the Fund was established in 1994 and is headquartered in Jordan).

At the end of 2001, the Egyptian Government initiated the formation of an extensive network of centers designed to study and analyze the situation of women's rights in the country, and to involve the public in the implementation of measures to prevent any encroachments on these rights, including those committed by administrative and other State authorities. Since the beginning of 2002, these centers have been established under the auspices of the National Council for Women's Affairs. The European Union and the Scandinavian countries have committed themselves to providing financial assistance to the centers and helping them learn from the experience of European human rights organizations. Initially, representatives of NGOs were supposed to participate in the work of the centers [Al-Ahram Weekly. 13 - 19.12.2001].

Meanwhile, the issue of the legal status of Egyptian non-governmental organizations required an immediate solution: Back in June 2000, the Egyptian Constitutional Court ruled that the 1999 NGO law was unconstitutional. Regarding this law as the embodiment of the Government's "iron fist policy", non-governmental organizations met the new law of 2002 with some caution, reservations and criticism of a number of its provisions. According to this act, all non-governmental organizations fell under clearly regulated state control. Prior to the election of the Board, they are required to submit an appropriate list of candidates for approval by the Ministry of Public Affairs. NGOs should also receive permission from the same Ministry not only to receive domestic or foreign sources of funding, but also for any public actions. The Ministry has the right to liquidate a non-governmental organization that has violated the law, violated public order and public morals. It was also subject to dissolution if illegal actions were committed only by the NGO management. The political activity of non-governmental organizations was outlawed, whether it was the participation of their members in election campaigns, the use of the organization's funds, or the representation of the interests of individual parties. Providing for the possibility of conflicts between State authorities (the Ministry of Public Affairs) and non-governmental organizations, the new law established a procedure for resolving a conflict situation with the participation of four parties: a judge, a representative of the administration, a representative of the NGO Federation and an NGO representative. Reconciliation was also possible through bilateral negotiations (for example, between representatives of the administration and NGOs). Most importantly, the 2002 law opened up the prospect for non-governmental organizations to be officially recognized and legitimized through registration with the Ministry of Public Affairs [Al-Ahram Weekly. 7 - 14.11.2002].

However, the implementation of such legislation required time and personal experience to ensure that in Egypt, both at the official and unofficial levels, the idea of dialogue and the transition of NGOs to partnership relations with the State for common human rights purposes did not fall into the "ears of the deaf". For many non-governmental organizations in Egypt, it was very important to get acquainted with the experience of foreign NGOs, with their principles of autonomy, self-organization, independence both from government authorities and from any groups seeking power. And most importantly-with their inclusion not only in the domestic, but also in the international mechanism for the protection of human rights [see: Matveeva, 1997].

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The events of March 20, 2003 served as a kind of impetus for changes in relations between official authorities and NGOs.After dispersing a demonstration in Cairo that protested against the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies, the state security forces reprisalized the organizers of this mass demonstration. NGO representatives used convincing arguments to refute the official version of incitement, if not direct participation in the demonstration, by Islamic extremists. At the same time, the question was raised about the need to establish a "culture of human rights" everywhere, especially in public administration structures. Some human rights defenders criticized some NGOs for using populist slogans to the detriment of specific human rights work. It was also said that it is time for the State to significantly expand the practice of officially recognizing those NGOs that have positively established themselves as genuine defenders of human rights, and to stop seeing all non-governmental organizations without exception as potential rebels and irresponsible troublemakers. Finally, it is time to effectively implement the principle of freedom of association enshrined in the Egyptian Constitution.

On June 24, 2003, the Ministry of Public Affairs registered the first non - governmental organization, the Egyptian Human Rights Organization. She fought for 18 years for her official recognition, and in 1991 even filed a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court against the refusal of registration. Ibrahim al-Tokhi, head of the Ministry's Department for Non-Governmental Organizations, said: "We welcome all those who work for the benefit of society, who demonstrate transparency in their work and obey the law." Regarding the simultaneous refusal to register other organizations, it was said that they have the right to challenge the refusal by going to court, and that the Ministry of Public Affairs will certainly agree with any subsequent court order [Al-Ahram Weekly. 10 - 16 July 2003].

The Egyptian press noted that the attitude of the authorities towards non-governmental organizations is largely determined by state security considerations and the requirements of such an" acid test", thanks to which extremist and other criminal groups will not be able to operate under the guise of a human rights association, and individual NGOs, having external funding, will not become agents of foreign influence. The fact that the Egyptian Human rights Organization excelled in the procedure of official registration of NGOs was explained by the international recognition of its activities: the UN Human Rights Committee has repeatedly included in its periodic reports a recommendation on the legal registration of the status of this organization. Attention was also drawn to the fact that since 1998, after the brief arrest of its head in connection with receiving financial support from abroad without the government's permission, it has practically no foreign sources of funding.

As you know, in the light of international human rights practice, official recognition of NGOs is an important stage in the formation of a national mechanism for the implementation of human rights and civil liberties. But this measure should be coupled with the formation of another link in this mechanism in the form of an institution for the protection of human rights that is formalized by law and has the necessary powers.

Two weeks before the registration of the Egyptian Human Rights Organization (June 7, 2003), the National Council for Human Rights was established by law, and judging by who is included in the leadership, what rights are given and what functions are assigned to the council, the Egyptian authorities are aimed at building this mechanism, but only under the control of the government. by their strict control.

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The National Human Rights Council was completed in January 2004 through the efforts of the country's highest consultative body, the Majlis al-Shura. Boutros Ghali, a former UN Secretary-General and a Copt by ethnic and religious affiliation, became the Chairman of the National Council. His deputy was appointed Ahmed Kamal Abu'l-Magd, a former Minister of Information, a representative of those Muslim circles that seek to correlate the fundamental, primarily spiritual and moral values of Islam with the assimilation of modern knowledge, skills and technologies by believers in the interests of social welfare, economic prosperity and cultural development. The 25-member National Human Rights Council also includes Fouad Riad (former judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia), Bahiddin Hassan (Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights), Mounir Abd al-Nour (Member of Parliament), Hafez Abu Seda (Secretary-General of the Egyptian Human Rights Organization) and Al-Ahram Weekly. 12 - 18 June 2003].

A month after the establishment of the National Council, Boutros Ghali discussed its work plans during a meeting with President Hosni Mubarak. The Council is responsible for developing a national plan for the protection of human rights, checking complaints from the population regarding violations of these rights, and ensuring the fair implementation of relevant international legal standards. The Council is charged with coordinating its actions with local and international human rights organizations, and providing an annual report to the President and Parliament on the situation in Egypt with these rights. And most importantly-to tirelessly form and affirm a "culture of human rights".

The National Council for Human Rights has established seven committees, six of which are supposed to deal with political, social, economic, civil, cultural and legislative aspects of human rights activities. The Seventh Committee is entrusted with checking complaints of the population and public organizations about human rights violations [Al-Ahram Weekly. 26.02-03.03.2004].

Meanwhile, the general situation in Egypt itself and abroad developed in such a way that at the official and unofficial levels, an understanding of the importance of observing universal, universally valid international legal norms marked by regional (country) ethno-cultural specifics was confirmed. The legitimacy of such norms was directly derived from the essence of international law, which is based primarily on the consensus of States and is designed to regulate relations between all members of the world community in the interests of peaceful coexistence, ensuring the well-being and security of all States and their citizens. In direct connection with this formulation of the issue, there was and still is an increasing concern of the official circles and the public not only in Egypt, but also in other eastern states, that the United States and its allies, having arbitrarily appropriated the functions of the global "protection of human rights", began to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, and in some cases (for example, Afghanistan and Iraq) bring the matter to military intervention.

At the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers held in Cairo in March 2004, it was decided to step up joint efforts to develop and adopt a charter on human rights that would be characterized by a "modern fresh perspective" on civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights. It is no secret that the existence of such a charter will provide the Arab East with at least a purely legal protection from outside interference under the slogan of "protecting human rights".

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list of literature

Zhdanov N. V. Islamic concept of the world order. International Legal, Economic and Humanitarian Aspects, Moscow, 1991.

Kovler A. I. Antropologiya prava [Anthropology of Law], Moscow, 2002.

Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt // Political system and the Constitution of the Arab Republic. M., 2003.

Matveeva T. D. Non-governmental organizations in mechanisms of human rights protection, Moscow, 1997.

Polenina S. V. Women's rights in the system of human rights: International and National aspects, Moscow, 2000.

Razhbadinov M. Z. Egypt of the 90s: state policy in relation to Islamic movements. 2004, N 4.

Syukiyainen L. R. Islamic concept of human rights: theoretical foundations, trends and development prospects // Human rights. Results of the century, trends, prospects, Moscow, 2002.

Al-Ahram Weekly. Cairo.

An-Naim. Islamic Family in a Changing World. London-New York, 2002.

Esposito J. L. Islam and Civil Society // Modernizing Islam. Religion in Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe. L., 2003.

Law N 1/2000 Promulgating the Procedural Personal Status // Official Journal. Cairo, 29 January 2000.

The Egyptian Gazette. Cairo.

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