Keywords: Ethiopia, state building, parliamentary elections, ethnic federalism, self-government system, interfaith relations

On May 24, this year, regular parliamentary elections were held in Ethiopia. Given the fact that this African state is a parliamentary republic under the Constitution, the importance of this event cannot be overemphasized. The ruling party, the Revolutionary Democratic Front of the Ethiopian Peoples (RDFEN), won ^{again for the third time}.

In what political and economic state does Ethiopia enter the next five-year stage of its development, and how will it approach the next elections in 2020? Political forecasts, especially for such a long-term perspective, are usually a thankless task, but I would still like to take a closer look at this distinctive African power and, perhaps, highlight some characteristic details of its development. So, what still prevails in the current life of Ethiopian society-the phenomena of political and social stagnation or the dynamics of stable development?

Ethiopia has always aroused genuine curiosity in the surrounding world, striking and surprising with its originality both in historical and cultural terms. Famous British historian Arnold Toynbee called this country "One of the amazing oddities of history". The outstanding Russian historian and geographer L. N. Gumilev considered it "a completely crazy country." Renowned Ethiopian historian Professor Richard Greenfield, describing the country's enchanting natural beauty, diverse landscapes and climatic zones, called it "African Switzerland" and compared it to mountainous Tibet2.

Ethiopia is indeed a country of vivid contrasts. An ancient civilization that stands at the intersection of different religious traditions and has absorbed much and from many. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: each of these great religions has made its own unique contribution to the formation of the Ethiopian cultural tradition, its statehood, and its ethnically and linguistically diverse population.³

Mysteriously born on the edge of diverse contacts with the ancient cultures of the Middle East, Ethiopia has nevertheless preserved a distinctive African culture. Having become an integral part of Christian civilization at the very beginning of its birth, it also seemed to hide from it behind the high walls of the Islamic world. The mysteries of the continuity of Ethiopia's existence from biblical times to the present day and the mystery of its relentless opposition to various historical factors contributed to the creation of a mystical aura around this country. Despite the repeated superiority of hostile forces, it did not fall before the Islamic invasions. Nor did it submit to the Western missionaries, who repeatedly, but in vain, tried to reformat Ethiopian Christianity anew.

In many ways surprising, Ethiopia is one of the few countries on the continent that did not capitulate to European colonizers, and remained independent for almost the entire course of its centuries - old history.⁴

Without claiming, due to the limited scope, to an exceptional depth of disclosure, the author in this article makes an attempt to show modern Ethiopia at least in the most general form. It is interesting to understand what is the strength and weakness of its cultural identity and originality? Isn't devotion to centuries-old cultural and religious traditions a sign of the stagnation of national (Ethiopian) statehood? Or, on the contrary, do the features of historical development ensure the stability of the country's internal political situation, creating the necessary and sufficient conditions for the development of the economy and the improvement of the country's political system in the medium and longer term?

From our point of view, the applied significance of the analysis of these issues is determined, inter alia, by the geographical proximity of Ethiopia to the North African region, whose countries continue to experience extremely contradictory consequences of the political process that has become known as the "Arab Spring". In this context, it was certainly interesting for us to try to formulate a forecast assessment of the extent to which the "revolutionary scenarios" of Arab Africa can be implemented and developed in neighboring sub-Saharan States.

Due to the fact that understanding the present day of any country is excluded without assessing the main milestones and stages of its historical development

The article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Science and Science, project No. 14-07-00026 "Determining factors for the implementation of the African Development Goals in the XXI century".

So let's start with a brief historical digression.

A BIT OF HISTORY

The Ethiopian Highlands are located in the center of the proposed zone of formation of the Ethiopoid anthropological type, Kushite languages and one of the most peculiar and ancient centers of agriculture in Africa. In the VI-V centuries BC, immigrants from various regions of southern Arabia, including the Sabaean kingdom, settled in the northern territories of modern Ethiopia (the Tigre Plateau). They brought with them a written language, a Semitic language, an ancient Semitic polytheistic religion, and the technique of stone construction by dry masonry.

The period of formation of Ethiopian statehood lasted for several subsequent centuries. The period of feudal fragmentation and decline of the Ethiopian principalities was replaced by the consolidation of central power and the collection of Ethiopian lands during the coming to power of a new strong ruler, Kassa Hailu, who became famous under the name of Emperor Tewodros II (reign 1855-1868). Despite the successful undertaking, his ambitions to create a unified and powerful state were not destined to come true. 13 years on the throne is too short a period for the political centralization of a country that has long been in a state of feudal fragmentation.⁵ The emperor died on April 10, 1868, as a soldier, preferring death by his own hand to the shame of surrender to the soldiers of the British expeditionary force.

Then there were new emperors, new defeats, and new victories. Among the outstanding rulers of Ethiopia, one can single out the talented politician and commander Sahle Mariam, who left a noticeable mark in history under the name of Menelik P. He ruled the country from 1889 until his death in 1913, and did much to strengthen Ethiopian statehood. One of his many achievements was the foundation of the new capital of the state - Addis Ababa (translated from the Amharic language-New Flower) on the territory of the central province of Shoah.

The complex and contradictory course of the historical formation of Ethiopian statehood, ultimately, had a serious impact on the content and features of cultural development, political tradition and public administration. The absence of a colonial past, in turn, also had a strong impact on the formation of the Ethiopian identity as an exceptional African people. The oldest unique monuments - material evidence of a highly developed civilization that existed on the Ethiopian land on the border of the IX-XI centuries (the Aksumite stele, the Lalibela temple complex* carved in inaccessible rocks in the image and likeness of Jerusalem, in which many unique relics of world religious and cult significance are artfully copied, the first lists of the oldest primary sources of Christian tradition created in the country in ancient Ethiopian, geez, and much more) gave Ethiopians a sense of cultural and religious exclusivity.

All these features have formed a complex and difficult-to-explain phenomenon of the Ethiopian national character. One of its features is an extremely acute, often excessive sense of pride and self-esteem, which is especially inherent in representatives of the Ethiopian elite. According to many European researchers and travelers, including domestic ones, Ethiopian pride sometimes borders on hidden arrogance and a sense of superiority.⁷

At the same time, the poverty and harsh conditions of the real, non-mythological or historical existence of the majority of the common people of Ethiopia have brought up cunning and adaptability in the Ethiopian character. Here we can almost always call a respectful and uncomplaining, and often servile attitude to those in power and the supreme power in general. In many ways, this is the result of the ideological influence of the church, which has always and under all regimes defended the state foundations, the basis of which for centuries was the imperial power headed by the anointed of God. As the well-known Russian Ethiopian historian G. V. Tsypkin quite rightly noted: "In a limited traditional world, where rumors about events from outside rarely reached (we are talking about the Ethiopian rural hinterland), the clergy completely owned the souls of the peasants. In the hands of the church there was also such a formidable weapon for a deeply religious Ethiopian as excommunication. " ⁸

It should be emphasized that to this day the majority of the population are true believers and are brought up in the Christian tradition of obedience, non-resistance and submission to authority. According to our observations, the Ethiopian religious tradition is very strict.

Fasts and religious holidays require complete dedication. Clergy, especially monks, are usually an example of complete self-denial from worldly excesses in literally everything-clothing, food, traditions. However, there was no other way out for the controlled development of such a vast territory, with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population of more than 50 million at the beginning of the last century and more than 96 million people today. For centuries, the worldview of the majority of the Ethiopian population, especially in rural areas, has been shaped by the narrow confines of traditional society. It was customary to perceive the hardships and hardships of their poor child-

* The names of places in and around the Lalibela complex - the Jordan River, the Mount of Olives, Adam's Grave, and the Church of Calvary-were intended to perpetuate the Christian legitimation of the land's rulers.

knowledge as the eternal and natural laws of life. Man was forced to adapt to it, and "be a submissive servant to his master and a good Christian." ¹⁰

Of course, there were exceptions to the country's political development. So, already in the modern history of the country, in 1974, the regime of the great emperor and talented politician Haile Selassie was deposed.¹¹ Just 15 years later, the pro-communist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, which in the last years of his rule was literally associated with fascism, was overthrown by armed force.¹² But at the same time, it can be stated that the people of the country as a whole or in the overwhelming majority of them did not show activity in either case.

Yes, there were separate speeches in the capital, mostly traditionally the most politicized segments of the population took part in them - these are students of the University of Addis Ababa, who very often and earlier preferred noisy, dangerous and so attractive in their own way by the power of destruction-street riots to boring lectures. But in order for the Ethiopian raznochintsy, and most importantly, the peasant population of the province (75-85% of the total population of the country)^We have picked up and carried the "wind of revolutionary change" in the image of the "Arab revolutions", there are no social prerequisites in the country yet and in the medium term there can be no social prerequisites. For the extreme radicalism of the Ethiopian political minority has encountered and will continue to encounter God-pleasing loyalty to the authorities and civil passivity.

In any case, until the necessary and sufficient conditions are created, which can happen, firstly, under the influence of an external influence, and secondly, with an unfavorable combination of several factors at once, which can outweigh and reverse a well-adjusted and well-built system that ensures controllability and relative stability of the system.

ETHNIC FEDERALISM

One of the key foundations of this system is a somewhat unique principle in its content, which could be conventionally referred to as ethnic federalism.

Initially, the political basis of the ruling coalition in the country today, called the Revolutionary Democratic Front of the Ethiopian Peoples (RDFEN), is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Tigray (PFOT) party, which is based in the northern Tigray province. It was the NFLP, led by the permanent political leader Meles Zenawi, that formed the basis of the movement, which came out in 1974 in an open armed confrontation with the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

The creation of the RDFEN was announced only in 1991, when the NFLN combat formations were already completing a victorious strategic offensive on the capital of Ethiopia. By this time, in addition to the NFLP, the RDFEN included four political parties representing the interests of other major nationalities in the country: the Oromo, the Amhara, and the Confederations of Southern Peoples. In the same year, 1991, the RDFEN coalition formed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, headed by Meles Zenawi, who remained the country's undisputed leader until his death in August 2012.

The new authorities have begun a process of radical transformation of the political system, based on two complementary elements. On the one hand, the emphasis was placed on building the political process around ethnic federalism, which was fundamentally important for multiethnic Ethiopia. On the other hand, it was decided to develop and fully strengthen political parties based on ethnic principles.

Thus, the ruling elite set itself the task of overcoming the hierarchical contradictions between different ethnic groups, which were of a historical nature. The political measures and reforms taken, especially in the last 7-10 years, were primarily aimed at changing the dominant position of the northern peoples (Amhara and Tigray) in relation to the population of the eastern regions (mainly Oromo) and the ethnically divided peoples of the south of the country. The development of the federal system helped to overcome ethnic contradictions, including by granting the maximum possible and formally equal rights and freedoms to all ethnic groups in the country.

Building Ethiopia on the principles of ethnic federalism was enshrined by the ruling party in the Constitution of 1994,14 For the first time in the entire long period of historical development, the Ethiopian state was decentralized, and ⁹ new regions were formed within its borders, formed according to the ethnic principle. Each region was granted autonomous rights, including the right to self-determination. Each region is governed by its own administration: from the highest body - the executive committee to the lowest level - " kabele "(amx. - kebele), whose tasks and functions will be discussed in more detail below.

However, ethno-federalism in its pure form, without structurally supporting political mechanisms, would be too dangerous for the stability of Ethiopian statehood due to its inherent centrifugal tendencies. Many times in the past and present, many peoples inhabiting the country (Oromo, Somalis, Eritreans, Tigraes, etc.) have demonstrated not only their readiness, but also their desire to build national states independent of Addis Ababa, within the borders of their native territories. Attempts and sentiments of separatism were suppressed, as a rule, by the military force of the center. Eritrea-

Russian separatism, as is well known, achieved its goals in 1993.*

PARTY UNITY OF COMMAND

In order to neutralize the centrifugal desire of other peoples for self-determination, along with the development of ethnic federalism, an important area of active political activity of the RDFEN has been and remains the strengthening of party unity of command.

The system of strict party hierarchy permeates the entire mechanism of state and regional governance of the country. In fact, we can say that ethnic federalism - with its centrifugal tendencies - is constrained by a vertically integrated party system. Being a centripetal structure in its organizational essence, the RDFEN thus binds and binds together the ethno-federal system of organization of the Ethiopian state at all levels. The ruling party is a kind of system of checks and balances.

It should be noted that until now, the Ethiopian party system has managed to maintain and cement the strength of national statehood quite reliably. This is certainly important in the context of the extremely complex ethnic and religious composition of the Ethiopian federation.

In the same context, we will highlight another feature of the Ethiopian social order, which contributes to maintaining the established public order. Let's call it a system of self-government or self-control of the daily life of the Ethiopian community. Given the uniqueness of this feature, let's take a closer look at it.

It is known that most regimes in Africa until recently, and some still do, ensure the stability of the internal political situation through the security forces (the army and special services). The loyalty of the security forces is largely achieved and supported by the ruling regime at the expense of material incentives and personnel policies. Commanders and leaders of the highest and operational rank are appointed, as a rule, from among people loyal to the clan or family principle.

The system of vertical power in Ethiopia from time immemorial and up to the present day is built on slightly different principles. It should be noted that if ethno-federalism, "cemented" around the party core, is a relatively new invention of the Ethiopian political elite, then the system discussed below, in one form or another, worked almost without failures both under the emperors and under the "communist" regime.

In its present form, the population management system, or, as it is formally called, the "people's self-government system", was formed back in 1975, shortly after the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime came to power. It is interesting that after his military overthrow, during the dismantling of the "pro-communist system of state and ideological structure" of Ethiopia, the new authorities radically changed almost everything that they inherited: starting from the name of the state, to the system of its political structure and the constitution.

"KABELE " IN ETHIOPIA TODAY

Only the "system of national self-government"remained unchanged, moreover, fully supported and significantly strengthened. The grassroots (primary) element of self-government is an elected body, which in Amharic is called "kabele". It has no analogues in the systems of state structure of other countries, operates in Ethiopia in every district of the city, village, village, settlement, any locality. One "kabele" unites at least 500 families, or the equivalent of 3500-4000 thousand inhabitants. Every locality in the country with a population of more than 2,000 people has at least one primary cell. Then, structurally, 10-12 primary self-government bodies of "kabele" are united into the so-called "cafitenya".

Despite being formally elected and independent from the authorities, by historical tradition and in its spirit, Kabele is in practice a controller of the moods and aspirations of the masses of the people accountable to higher authorities in the truest sense of the word. Vertical connections of the primary self-government unit with higher-level rural, municipal, urban, regional and central state bodies are not always obvious, but they allow us to reliably monitor everything that happens at the very bottom, to level negative moods in a timely manner, at the same time correctly and ideologically sustained inform the people, and work subtly with their electors.

In addition, through a complex, extremely closed system of covert and intricate indirect links with the state apparatus, Kabele activists fruitfully cooperate with the authorities and, of course, the special services. Under the pretext of ensuring security, including prevention and prevention of terrorist threats, as well as monitoring the criminal situation, work is underway to collect information that is constantly transmitted by activists, as well as collected through embedded regular and non-regular informants of the police and other special services. Any suspicious moments, cases of public order violations, criminal offenses, the appearance of suspicious or unregistered persons in the area, etc. are reported.

* Eritrea is a former northern province of Ethiopia. It gained independence in 1993 as a result of nearly 30 years of armed struggle waged by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (PFL), first against the imperial regime of Haile Selassie I, and then Mengistu Haile Mariam.

collecting information about the loyalty of the population, politically unreliable individuals and oppositionists, who are taken under the control of the special services on the basis of "signals" from the ground.

In exchange for providing assistance to state agencies, Kabele activists have specific benefits and certain powers. For example, at the level of the management of Kabele, such important issues for the Ethiopian community are resolved as the distribution of food aid, issuing recommendations to citizens for receiving subsidies for medical care, primary education, etc.

In rural areas, decisions and petitions of primary cells depend on the distribution of grain seeds allocated by the Ministry of Agriculture for sowing, fertilizers, as well as support or rejection of requests from farmers and farmers for bank loans and various types of social assistance.

Another important element in the work of Kabele is the administration of justice at the level of the so-called "social (people's) courts". They are authorized to consider and make decisions on minor and socially harmless offenses or civil disputes within their territory. Some cabels even operate local prisons and have their own squads of volunteer police assistants.

It is clear that such significant socio-economic privileges distributed through "kabele" have a meaning that cannot be overestimated for ordinary citizens living on its territory. The analysis of benefits and privileges distributed through primary cells provides an understanding of the influence of managers of these structures.

As it is obvious from the above review of the functions and powers of Kabele, they are in demand, fully cope with the tasks set in everyday life, and are also extremely useful during the pre-election work of the ruling party. In general, it can be stated that the "system of self-government" is quite perfect, in demand and remains one of the mechanisms for ensuring the internal political stability of society.

PROBLEMATIC "POINTS OF TENSION GROWTH"

At the same time, it would be extremely wrong to overestimate the mechanisms that ensure the stability of Ethiopia's political and social development to one degree or another, and not pay attention to problematic issues. There are many of them, and recently the" points of increasing tension " in Ethiopian society have become more noticeable and obvious.

First of all, among them, we should note the centrifugal tendencies inherent in Ethiopian ethnic federalism, which are constantly met with intense and growing opposition from rigid party centralism. At a certain stage, it is precisely the relatively reliable system of checks that is currently in place that may at some point turn from a bulwark of stability into a destabilizing factor.

The fact is that the party hierarchy, gaining more and more influence, sometimes begins to replace the executive authorities, which, of course, causes discontent both among the official apparatus and in the wider population. At this stage, the indicated negative trend is carefully hidden and hushed up.

At the same time, a completely centralized and non-transparent system for making the most important decisions on key issues of the country's development, to which a very limited circle of party functionaries and personal advisers to the head of government is allowed, may cause certain failures in the medium and longer term. In the modern domestic political hierarchy, sometimes even ministers are not independent in making the most important decisions and are forced to act very cautiously. State officials, even high-ranking ones, constantly look back at party leaders, and also by default adopt the practice of informal coordination of their decisions with a group of so-called "advisers to the Prime Minister's office" assigned to various departments.

Another difficult issue of domestic political development in the near future will become increasingly obvious the absence of a real multi-party system in the country. This problem is interrelated with the aspects of the organization of the internal political process, which we have already discussed above. Since 1991, the RDFEN has remained a permanent and uncontested ruling party. Although formally it is multiparty, since it includes several parties representing different nationalities, but its formal multiparty is still mostly ethnic federalism, which, in fact, is far from political pluralism.

There is no significant political opposition in Ethiopia today. This fact causes growing criticism from almost all non-African foreign policy partners, with the possible exception of China, which, as always, formally remains outside politics and acts solely on the principles of its own economic expediency.

The question of the relationship between democracy and stability remains, perhaps, one of the most difficult and painful for the further political development of not only Ethiopia, but also most, with rare exceptions, African countries as a whole.

There is an opinion in the expert community that a real multi-party system and Western-style democracy, both today and in the near foreseeable future, is unacceptable for most African countries. The leadership of Ethiopia, as well as most of the continent's countries, is looking for its own unique way of developing local society and pea-

it leases its own internal political program.

It seems that this path is not infallible, but it cannot be forced under any circumstances. Rushing, and even more so exerting pressure in the interests of instilling "Western values" and accelerating the development of the democratic process in Ethiopia - this is, in fact, one of the most real threats to stability, and more dangerous than the absence of a multi-party system and political opposition at this stage.

We believe that the mechanical transfer of Western parliamentarism to Ethiopian soil, the holding of truly democratic elections in the country in conditions of underdeveloped civil society and the predominance of ethnic and clan consciousness among the overwhelming majority of the population would lead to such an aggravation of ethno-confessional contradictions, which could be disastrous for the Ethiopian statehood. Under these conditions, society needs a long transition period to democracy, which will allow for the formation of a sufficiently developed civil society and, with the help of state regulation of the economy, will ensure sustainable socio-economic development of the country.

When discussing the risk factors, we should point out another problem - excessive influence on the processes taking place in Ethiopia, including economic, social and domestic political ones, by external forces. Economic statistics show that, despite the relatively high development indicators compared to the pan-African ones, Ethiopia continues to be increasingly economically dependent on the outside world.

It is generally accepted that the main donors of the national economy are the countries of the European Union, the United States and China. However, their participation is far from proportional, and over the past 10 years, Addis Ababa's foreign economic relations with Beijing have been steadily growing. Cooperation is also being intensified with India, Turkey, and recently with Brazil. Some observers at the beginning of the second decade of this century even talk about a possible crisis or at least a decline in US-Ethiopian relations.

To some extent, such estimates are not without reason. For example, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in one of his interviews, noting that Ethiopia strives for a balanced development of relations with both the United States and China, explicitly emphasizes that "the Chinese, being the driving force of the world economy, help developing countries without any conditions by providing credit lines." for infrastructure projects". Therefore, according to the Ethiopian leader, reliance on China in infrastructure and investment development, obtaining modern technologies is extremely important. Hailemariam Desalegn notes that Ethiopia will strategically rely on the development of comprehensive relations with China, India and in some areas with Brazil. But at the same time, he says, "we have nothing against the United States, our choice in favor of China is not an ideology, it is a practical consideration." ¹⁵

It should be noted that in recent years, the country's former leader Meles Zenawi has repeatedly declared intentions and taken practical measures to reduce dependence on China and diversify relations, including through their more active development with Russia. However, due to a number of circumstances, it was not possible to achieve any obvious success in this area.

Recently, especially in the last two or three years, the tendency to prioritize the development of relations with Beijing has become more and more obvious. In the current circumstances, it is difficult to count on a real breakthrough in Ethiopia's economic relations with Russia. One, though not the main, reason for this remains, among other things, the active actions of the pro-Chinese lobby among the executive level of the Ethiopian official apparatus, which often sabotages top-level decisions aimed at diversifying the country's economic policy.

We agree with the estimates of many observers who believe that in recent years, Chinese influence through the economy on Ethiopian politics has become excessive.¹⁶ At the same time, the factor of Chinese influence cannot be considered simplistically or unilaterally state its negative content. It should be borne in mind that China's economic support, especially the development of serious infrastructure projects, is very important for the country as a whole. Today, Chinese assistance to Ethiopia is sometimes an alternative option for solving serious socio-economic problems facing the state and government. However, in the end, it is also necessary to recognize the fact that Chinese economic assistance is already becoming significantly dependent on Ethiopia.

As for foreign policy and foreign economic cooperation with the other world, including the United States and a united Europe, the Ethiopian government shows obvious pragmatism here. Competently and profitably using its own regional position (a" springboard " of Christianity in the Islamic environment, a reliable partner in the counter-terrorism coalition, an active regional and African peacekeeper), the Ethiopian leadership seeks significant economic dividends from the West, and also competently maneuvers and seeks to reduce the level of pressure from the United States and the European Union on issues such as democracy that are painful for Ethiopians, human rights, etc.

In general, today we can say that economic relations with the West are more demonstrative

They cover mainly humanitarian and social spheres. Examples include European sponsorship for the development of Ethiopia's peacekeeping capabilities, as well as some social projects.

Concluding the review of foreign policy factors of influence, we note regional instability. The Horn of Africa has traditionally remained one of the most conflict-prone ¹⁷. The ongoing internal political conflicts in neighboring Somalia and Sudan, the activation of Islamic terrorists in Kenya, together and under certain circumstances, can exert destabilizing pressure on the internal political situation in Ethiopia.

The convincing examples of popular unrest in North Africa and the Middle East in early 2011, directed against corrupt State authorities, make the Ethiopian leadership more carefully consider and overcome a number of other negative scenarios.

These include, first of all, the so-called youth factor and the activation of political Islam. In the first case, it is necessary to solve the problems of employment and social adaptation of the country's young population, which traditionally acts as a driving force for "revolutionary changes". In Ethiopia, as in a number of other countries, including those affected by the "Arab Spring" syndrome, there is a " so-called demographic priority of youth - a disproportionately large proportion of the young population experiencing difficulties in cultural and economic assimilation. The revolution in communication technologies makes this factor doubly dangerous. Educated, but often unemployed and therefore desperate and alienated, young people join the ranks of paramilitary groups... In fact, this is a demographic powder keg. " ¹⁸

Today, the Ethiopian leadership is clearly aware of this problem. The youth direction is a priority in the work of both local "kabele", as well as power structures and party bodies. However, the" youth factor " remains one of the most potentially dangerous and will continue to require active and thoughtful actions from the authorities.

"A CHRISTIAN ISLAND IN THE SEA OF ISLAM"?

The problems of increasing and expanding the role of political Islam in Ethiopian public life and the hypothetical danger of its descent into extremely radical forms are another serious dilemma of the current stage of the country's development.¹⁹

Unfortunately, the acute socio-economic problems of Ethiopia were not solved under the old slogans of Christian monarchy and scientific socialism with its state atheism. They continue to remain acute even in modern conditions, when the country's leadership declares its commitment to Western-style liberalism and democracy. Naturally, against the background of discrediting previous ideas and slogans in Ethiopia (especially in its southern and eastern parts), their alternative in the form of an Islamic path of social development is gaining popularity.

It is well known that Ethiopia has played the role of a "Christian island in the sea of Islam"for many centuries. In recent years, the situation has begun to change more and more noticeably. The growing influence of Islam is evident to anyone who returns to the country. The current authorities prefer not to notice the progressive weakening of the position of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The mass construction of mosques*is a clear manifestation of the growing influence of Islam.

It is particularly noteworthy that a large number of new mosques have appeared not only in the historically Muslim south and east of Ethiopia, but also in traditionally Christian areas in the north. The steady increase in the number of Ethiopian Muslims creates the basis for strengthening their role in the political life of the country and in the Horn of Africa as a whole. However, the increase in the number of adherents of Islam in itself would not cause serious concern, because Ethiopia has always been a multi-religious country and has historically been known for religious tolerance. The real danger lies in a completely different plane.

Recent events indicate that the peaceful coexistence of religions can be unexpectedly and insidiously undermined by external influence. The most recent and weighty confirmation of such fears was another inhumane provocation of the Islamic State (IS), when on April 20 this year, 30 Christian Ethiopians who had previously been captured by Islamist militants in Libya were publicly brutally executed.²⁰ This action caused a massive protest in Ethiopia. The outrage of broad sections of the Ethiopian public instantly created conditions for religious clashes in major cities of the country.

Islamists who have committed a crime in another country cannot be reached, but retribution and revenge must be carried out. This dangerous thesis led to the fact that the most radical local citizens made calls to smash mosques and expel Muslims from their land. The situation escalated to the limit, and only thanks to the urgent and decisive actions of the Ethiopian authorities, this time it was possible to prevent mass clashes on religious grounds.

Federal police forces stopped dangerous provocations at the earliest stage. On the morning of April 21, the country's Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, led a massive peace rally, which was held only in Addis Ababa.

* Between 2000 and now, the number of mosques in Addis Ababa and its immediate suburbs alone has increased from 8 to 80.

several hundred thousand people took part. The call of the country's leadership, supported by the highest hierarchs of the Orthodox and Muslim churches, as well as leaders of religious communities in Ethiopia, not to succumb to the provocation of Islamists and not to allow fratricide was heard and accepted by the population.²¹

At the end of April, the crisis was stopped, but for how long, and will there be a new provocation from outside that could shake up the country? In a country of more than 96 million people, where Christians and Muslims are almost equally divided, any escalation of the religious situation can have unpredictable consequences.

* * *

Summing up briefly, it can be noted that due to the historical, cultural and religious development of the country, as well as a number of political factors, Ethiopia today has a relatively stable internal political situation. A balanced social and economic policy of the Ethiopian leadership, formally aimed at supporting the main segments of the population, contributes to the consolidation of Ethiopian society.

Forecasts of medium-term political stability, favorable climatic conditions, and the presence of a significant young working-age population actively attract external investment resources to Ethiopia, primarily from China, India, and Turkey, which ensures relatively high economic growth rates on a pan-African scale. In addition, the entry of Chinese state-owned companies into long-term infrastructure projects in Ethiopia also means that China is more actively involved in ensuring domestic political security.

On the other hand, the political stability and economic activity of major Asian economies ensure the return to Ethiopia of significant financial assets transferred from the country to the United States and Europe during political crises (1974 - the overthrow of the monarchy and 1991 - the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam). The return of Ethiopian emigrants to their homeland-now citizens of developed countries of the world-ensures the further development of Ethiopian society and entails the foreign policy support of influential Ethiopian diasporas from the United States, Germany and Italy.

At the same time, when focusing on the medium-term forecast of domestic political stability in the longer term, one cannot ignore the impact of a number of negative trends that have recently become more active. Thus, the political elite of the country, which has ruled the country since 1991, is still secretly but growing dissatisfaction with the permanent status and ethnic heterogeneity in favor of immigrants from the northern province of Tigray. The tension in society is caused by the formally one-party system and the underdeveloped civil society. However, the most disturbing and dangerous trends for further development are the factors of external adverse effects, both regional and international, as well as the hypothetical possibility of radicalization of religious relations between the leading denominations of Ethiopia.

¹ According to figures released by the National Electoral Council of Ethiopia on 22 June, RDFEN won all 500 seats. Another 46 seats in the Council of People's Representatives (the lower house of Parliament) are distributed among the national parties, which are the closest political allies of the RDFEN. The RDFEN and its allies also have an overwhelming majority (1987 out of 2008) of seats in regional legislative assemblies. http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/

^{Richard Greenfield.} 2 Ethiopia. A New Political History. Pall Mall Press, London, 1965.

³ For more information about the history of religions in Ethiopia, see, for example: "Ethiopia. Christianity, Islam, Judaism " / Ed. by Prof. Hagai Ehrlich. Open University of Israel. 2006.

⁴ An exception is the period from May 1936 to May 1941, when the country fell under the military occupation of fascist Italy. Emperor Haile Selassie left Ethiopia and was granted asylum in England, from where he formally continued to lead the movement for the liberation of the country. On May 9, 1936, Italy officially declared the annexation of Ethiopia. On June 1, the King of Italy was proclaimed emperor, and Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland were united to form the colony of Italian East Africa.

During the entire period of occupation, the Ethiopian patriots continued to resist. On July 12, 1940, Great Britain officially recognized Ethiopia as an ally. Haile Selassie arrived in Sudan by plane. On January 15, 1941, the Ethiopian army led by the Emperor began military operations. Already on May 5, 1941, Haile Selassie solemnly entered the liberated capital, and on May 20, 1941, the last Italian units surrendered. Ethiopia's State independence was restored.

⁵ History of Africa in biographies / Under the general editorship of A. Davidson. Moscow, 2012, p. 1046.

⁶ For more information on the biography of Emperor Tewodros II, see Sahle Sellassie. "Warrior King". A Biographical Novel. Shama Books. Robot printers. Addis-Ababa. 2013.

⁷ See, for example: Bulatovich A. With the troops of Menelik P. M., IV of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 1971; Bulatovich A. The third journey through Ethiopia. Moscow, 1987.

^{Tsypkin G. V.} 8. From fragmentation to political centralization (the second half of the XIX-beginning of the XX century). Moscow, GRVL, Nauka publishing house. 1980. p. 37.

⁹ http://worlds-population.com/ru/Ethiopia/

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ History of Africa in biographies... p. 1054.

¹² Ibid., p. 928.

¹³ http://countrymeters.info/ru/Ethiopia

¹⁴ http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/ethiopian-constitution-1994_en.pdf

¹⁵ http://www.afriсa-confidential.com/special-report/id/24/Interview_with_Hailemariam_Desale gn

¹⁶ See, for example: Deich T. L. Africa in the Strategy of China. Moscow, IAfr RAS. 2008. (Deich T. L. 2008. Afrika v strategii Kitaya) (in Russian)

¹⁷ The Horn of Africa. Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security. Edited by Redie Bereketeab. The Nordic Africa Institute. 2013. P. 3-5. "

^{Brzezinski Zbigniew.} 18 Strategic View: America and the Global Crisis, Moscow, 2012, pp. 48-49.

¹⁹ For more information on the role and influence of political Islam, see Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. Alex de Waal editor. Shama Books. Addis-Ababa. Ethiopia. 2004.

²⁰ http://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/66478

²¹ http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/158203/ethiopians-held-protest-against-isil-killing

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