В статье анализируется партийная борьба на Занзибаре во "время политики " и в канун революции (1957-1964). Рассматриваются процесс создания и идеологические установки партий в ходе выборных кампаний в Законодательный совет султаната. На основе сложившихся в период британского управления Занзибаром социальных и расово-кулътурных классификаций в первой трети XX в. на территории протектората создаются ассоциации, ориентированные на защиту экономических интересов соответствующих групп, а в 1950-е годы послужившие основой для создания партий. Соперничая за поддержку избирателей, обе ведущие политические организации архипелага - "проарабская " Националистическая партия Занзибара и "проафриканская " Партия Афро-Ширази использовали апелляцию к культурному национализму. Противопоставление "арабского " и "африканского " в борьбе за голоса ширази явилось "основным нервом" политической активности на архипелаге. Автор исследует истоки возникновения агрессивного коммунализма на Занзибаре, который в сочетании с дискриминационными практиками обусловил обострение межобщинной розни на архипелаге, а после революции 1964 г. затруднял интеграционные процессы в союзном государстве Танганьики и Занзибара - Танзании.

words: Keywords: Tanzania, "race question", the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar, socio-political processes, federalism.

Political activity in Zanzibar is influenced by two" poles of attraction " - "African" and "Arab", stable cliches associated with the images of the African continent and the Arab East, respectively. This dualism, which determines the dynamics of Zanzibar's development, reproduces the internal crisis and contradictions in the archipelago's relations with the rest of the world, is perceived as an unsolvable problem and forces political actors to look for a "third force" that can offer alternative ways to resolve the conflict. However, how can we get out of the vicious circle of "racial contradictions" in a situation where the main political forces in the archipelago, according to the tradition laid down in the period before and after the January 1964 revolution in Zanzibar, use the language of cultural nationalism and understand the goals of social development differently? Attempts to find the "third path" are complicated by the conceptual fuzziness of the search object. As an alternative to" African "and" Arab", the ideas of" Shirazi"," Zanzibari "or some unique, cosmopolitan," culturally mixed "society are proposed - a local, original community, true to the Islamic heritage, "not African" and" not Arab", although it has experienced Persian and Arab influence and is guided by Arabic the world.

Historical memory forms a different attitude of Zanzibarians to the revolution and to the subsequent formation of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 - events that were determined by intra-island contradictions, the struggle for "their" Zanzibar [Siim, 2014, pp. 290-291]. The division continues along the lines of mainland / island, foreign / indigenous, African/Shiraz/Arabic. Since the ground for disagreements in the archipelago and for tension in its relations with the continental part of ORT remains, the fundamental confrontation between the two leading political organizations remains in force, as in the pre-revolutionary period of Zanzibar history [Mapuri, 1996]. We are talking about the "heirs" of the Afro-Shirazi Party (PASH, established in 1957) and the Nationalist Party of Zanzibar ( NPZ, 1955) - respectively, the Revolutionary Party (Chama cha Mapinduzi, CHM, 1977) and the Civil

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united Front (GOUGH, 1992). The former is in favor of preserving the union in its original "Nyererewa" version with two governments - the union and Zanzibar. GOUGH defends the need for federalization and the introduction of a system of three governments, fights for self-determination and independent development of Zanzibar.

DISCUSSION ON THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN ZANZIBAR

Since analogies from the history of Zanzibar can be found in the development of the current situation, it is important to take into account the results of new socio-cultural and political studies, including on the problems of nation-building and interreligious relations in Tanzania [Bondarenko, 2005], factors that mitigate and keep the process of politicization of inter-community relations within the acceptable limits in civil society [Bondarenko, 2008, p. 94].

Looking at the prehistory of the Zanzibar Revolution, American political scientist Michael Lofchi analyzes the electoral behavior of Zanzibaris in the conditions of party struggle, as well as the electoral system in the sultanate. The principles of its organization, as events have shown, did not correspond to the interests of the majority of the inhabitants of the archipelago and inevitably led to a violent confrontation. According to Lofchie, the armed uprising was a reaction of Africans to the system of social inequality and the policies pursued by the politically and economically dominant Arab minority on the islands and their British patrons (Lofchie, 1965).

Tanzanian historian Samuel Ayani highlights the cultural factor as key to the archipelago's political development. To be considered an African in Zanzibar was to be a second-class person, and the desire to eliminate inequality became the main driving force of the revolution. Studying the events of political life on the eve of the revolution, Ayany noted that the colonial administrators were unable to ensure a smooth transfer of power in the archipelago from the Arab minority to the African majority (Ayany, 1977).

In the writings of the Zanzibar historian Abdul Sherif, the 1964 revolution appears not as the overthrow of the Arab oligarchy by the African majority, as it is usually presented in historiography, but as a civil war in a " cosmopolitan society "in which there were no common unifying" national bonds " [Sheriff, 2001, p.313].

An ideologue and participant in the Zanzibar revolution, who was later removed to secondary positions in the government and then spent several years in prison, Abdul Rahman Mohammed Babu criticized Nyerere's policies and the nature of the union. The creators of the revolution in Zanzibar, Babu believed, were moving towards a complete break with colonialism and the West. Formed in 1961 by the African National Union of Tanganyika (TANU, established in 1954), the government, which was "looked after" by the colonial authorities and the World Bank, moved in the direction of neocolonialism and did not try to defend the independence of Tanganyika. The opposition politician added cultural arguments to the economic and political arguments: trying to link two countries together meant mixing oil and water [Babu, 1989, p. 4], i.e., connecting the unconnected.

Babu's thoughts on the socio-economic, political, and cultural "separateness" of the archipelago and its fundamental incompatibility with Tanganyika were developed by the First Vice - President (2010-present) of Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad. Native of O. A Pemba and opposition politician, he emphasizes his island and Shiraz identity. Hamad's idea that the revolution was prepared in Tanganyika and implemented in Zanzibar with the help of Tanganyika is key.

When Hamad argues that Tanganyika expanded its sovereignty at the expense of Zanzibar by entering into an alliance with the archipelago, he returns to biologizing the differences. The idea of unity is commendable, but the "mainlanders" and islanders see it from different angles. Tanganyika borders several states, and some tribes inhabit the territory on the other side of the border: in this case,

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The politician sees the reason for the greater "natural" proximity between Tanganyika and its mainland neighbors than between it and Zanzibar. S. S. Hamad sees the concern of "African nationalists", the central government of ORT about the historical ties of Zanzibar with the Islamic world, the Arab countries of the Gulf-ties stronger than with the African continent [Burgess, 2009, P. 308-309].

Tanzanian jurist and political scientist Issa Shivji, arguing about the socialist or nationalist nature of the Zanzibar revolution, concludes that it was not a social, but a political action, since it did not have broad public support. In the author's research, the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union crisis appears as a result of the rivalry of nationalisms - cultural, racial and territorial, as a consequence of inadequate borders drawn by the colonialists, economic injustices and the policy of "divide and rule", which turned" differences into discord " [Shivji, 2008, p.68, 245-250].

The author of a large number of publications on the history of Tanzania, Godfrey Mwakikagile, comes to the conclusion that the creation of a union state was inevitable and the revolution only served as an impetus for the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar [Mwakikagile, 2014, pp. 11-12, 50].

The opposite view is that the revolution was the highest point of denial of the cosmopolitan, multicultural heritage of Zanzibar [Burgess, 2009, p. 1-2]. According to the Arabs who emigrated from the archipelago during and after the revolution, the essence of what is happening is that "black" Africa is trying to absorb the" Arab island " of Zanzibar, and the 1964 coup is the result of a plot by Tanganyika and Nyerere personally, a "crusade" against Islam. Thus, Arab nationalists absolutize the external factors of the revolution, ignoring the internal ones. According to this logic, the creation of ORT is not a voluntary union, but an annexation, seizure, deprivation of sovereignty, and forcible annexation of Zanzibar by Tanganyika [Beloshapko, 2014, pp. 63-64].

CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN POLITICAL PRACTICE

The origins of the political conflict in Zanzibar are to be found in the pre-colonial and colonial past of the islands. Based on the social and racial-cultural classifications that developed under the British, government-sanctioned organizations are created in the archipelago, initially aimed at defending the economic interests of the relevant groups, and later served as the basis for the creation of political parties. In 1922, the Arab Association (AA) was formally registered, but actually began to operate in 1901 [Loimeier, 2009, p.27] (according to other sources in 1907-1908). Initially, the aim of the AA was to protect the interests of the Arabs, whose businesses suffered as a result of the abolition of the slave trade.

In 1910, the Association of Indians was formed, which was relatively poorly involved in political activities. Other organizations with a "cultural component" also functioned, such as the Comorian Association. Associations of Zanzibari-Africans appeared much later. These organizations were designed to unite Africans and promote the "development of national identity": before that, the words "African" and "African" were not even used in the Sultanate of Zanzibar [Teterin, 2012, p.846]. In 1934, on the basis of the African Sports Club, the Association of Africans of Zanzibar (AAZ) was organized, whose head in 1939 was A. A. Karume. Among its leaders were Christians. AAP collaborated with the Tanganyika Association of Africans (TAA), but their alliance collapsed in 1947, as the rivalry between their leaders and the political orientation of these organizations to their respective territorial communities at that time proved stronger than pan-African aspirations.

In an effort to limit AAZ's influence in the archipelago, the British declared it a Christian party, which made it difficult for the organization to operate in "Muslim" Zanzibar. The colonialists managed to split the Association of Africans and withdraw from it

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Shirazi, trying to exploit friction and secure the border between" indigenous "and" non-indigenous " Zanzibaris. At the same time, there was a constant debate about who could be called a "native, real Zanzibari" and the associated rhetoric and exclusion policy that was practiced in the archipelago. As a result of the split of AAZ in 1938, the Shirazi Association (ASH) was formed. It originated on fr. Pemba later expanded its activities to the entire archipelago. The colonial authorities supported ASH and helped establish contacts with Arab organizations.

An illustrative example of the British policy of discrimination and tactics of dividing Africans is given in the work of V. E. Ovchinnikov. During the Second World War, a card system was introduced in Zanzibar due to food shortages. "Arabs" and" Asians "were supposed to have more rice and sugar in larger quantities and of higher quality than"Africans". The Africans demanded that they be provided with the same amount of food as Asians, and the Shirazi referred to their "also Asian" origin. The colonial authorities only granted Shirazi's request. Any African who was issued a certificate of belonging to Shirazi by the Shirazi Association received a corresponding food card (Ovchinnikov, 1986, p. 158).

The cultural and racial divisions supported by the colonialists proved to be very tenacious, stable, and reproduced in the political practice of Zanzibar even after independence. However, now the composition and ratio of the former groups have changed: there has been a fragmentation and "reformatting" of political organizations, coalitions from representatives of different communities have been created. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party, formed in 1955 with the participation of the Arab Association and the Sultan of Zanzibar's Subjects Nationalist Party (Hizbu), founded by Swahili figures, preached multi-racial but practiced racialism. The refinery fought to expand the voting rights of the archipelago's residents, especially the" real Zanzibaris " - Arabs and Shirazi.

The national identity of Zanzibar was interpreted by the refinery in a non-African spirit, the emphasis was placed on the idea of Zanzibar as a culturally autonomous Islamic state. The ideology of" Zanzibari " provided for loyalty to the Sultan as the supreme ruler. Islam was given a key role: it was designed to overcome racial divisions and unite Zanzibaris of different tribal origins. Thus, the nationalism of the oil refinery cannot be considered universalist because it excluded non-Muslims. It was an Arabic version of Zanzibar nationalism.

Formed on the basis of the Zanzibar Afrikaners ' Association and the Shirazi Association in 1957, the Afro-Shirazi Party claimed to represent the interests of Shirazi, Zanzibaris of continental African and mixed ("Afro-Shirazi") descent. The leaders of the PASH used the idea of a common Zanzibar nationalism with African, which was associated in pan-Africanism. During the pre - election campaign, the refinery's propaganda claimed that the PASH's goal was to sell the Tanganyika archipelago, flood it with immigrants, destroy the Muslim religion in Zanzibar and introduce Christianity. The mainly Wapemba-oriented Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party and the religious-based Indo-Pakistani Muslim Association also participated in the political struggle.

MECHANISMS OF PARTY STRUGGLE

Aggressive communalism, disagreements over the strategy and tactics of the struggle for independence and orientation towards a narrowly defined social base accompanied the activities of all the leading parties in Zanzibar. Thus, the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (NPPP) emerged in 1959 as a result of a split in the leadership of the PAH. This happened despite the fact that "from the mainland", from the lips of the leaders of PAFMECA (Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa), in 1959, appeals were made to the representatives of the PAFMECA (Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa).

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There are calls to prevent the racial issue from being turned into an obstacle to the formation of a unified line for achieving independence in Zanzibar. PAFMECA activist, first President of Tanganyika and then Tanzania, J. R. R. Tolkien Nyerere noted that Zanzibar has an atmosphere of masters and slaves; all parties recognize a common political goal, but oppose each other on racial grounds [Lofchie, 1965, p.191, 208]. Then, during the election campaigns of 1961, a split occurred in the ranks of the NPZP on the basis of disagreements about the support of the PASH or the refinery. During the elections and during the formation of the Sultanate government in 1961 and 1963, the refinery operated in conjunction with the refinery.

The internal mechanisms of party struggle in the archipelago were determined by the different political behavior of the inhabitants of the islands of Unguja and Pemba, which, in turn, was explained by differences in the tribal and class composition of the population, in the system of economy and distribution of land suitable for cultivation. The Shirazi of Pemba and Tumbatu (wapemba and watumbatu) Islands were loyal to the Arabs, the Sultan's regime, and the oil refineries, since they, unlike the Shirazi of Unguja (Wahadimu), were not subject to forced relocation.

Not the least role was played by the methods of establishing Arab domination in the archipelago. On Unguja, the Omani Busaidi dynasty won the loyalty of the local rulers to Wahadim by threatening to use military force. Thus, the Arabs in the eyes of the indigenous population looked like colonizers in the full sense of the word. Pemba came under the control of the Omanis as a result of a voluntary pact ("bloodbrotherhood"), concluded between local leaders and the Sultan, as almost equal partners. Many Wapemba believed that the Arabs were" by the will of God " the rightful rulers of the archipelago.

On Unguja, the percentage of the Arab population was smaller, the percentage of the African population was larger. On Pemba, the situation was reversed: there were relatively more Arabs and fewer mainland Africans, and the fertile soil occupied almost the entire island. Here, the working masses of Shirazi and Arabs, among whom there were many small, well-to-do landowners, held similar economic positions and formed close social, including family, ties. This made Pembu different from Unguja, where the Shirazi, along with mainland Africans, suffered from economic exploitation by large Arab landowners. Fertile soils were found only in the western part of Unguja. They were occupied as plantations owned by Arab landlords, which were cultivated by African squatters. According to the results of voting in the elections, the following pattern can be traced: PASH received a majority in the economically least prosperous areas of the archipelago, among the poorest population dissatisfied with the existing regime.

"Time of Politics "(swah. zama za siasa) in Zanzibar - election campaigns for the Legislative Council in the late 1950s and early 1960s, party splits and regroupings-were marked by a struggle between Arab and African nationalists for the support of Shirazi, including Wapemba peasants (Bowles, 1991, p. 101). The Arabs took advantage of the reluctance of certain groups of Shirazi to block with Africans during the elections. Shirazi's attitude toward both Arabs and mainland Africans was ambivalent. While campaigning for Shirazi in their favor, Arabs and mainland Africans used the image of a stranger, an immigrant, in relation to each other.

Moreover, in the 1940s, when competing for seats in the Legislative Council, AAP figures used anti-Shiraz rhetoric, arguing that Shirazi are "Asians" and therefore cannot represent the interests of Africans in Zanzibar. Shirazi retorted: residents of the archipelago in the 5th or 6th generation should speak on behalf of Zanzibaris. On this basis, mainland Africans were denied the right to sit in the Legislative Council, citing their "shallow roots" in the archipelago (Sheriff, 2001, pp. 308-309). In Zanzibar, the Arab and African, as well as Shiraz (in Unguja and Pemba) versions of Zanzibar nationalism and the vision of the islands ' future, their path to independence and the establishment of democratic parliamentarism, thus collided.

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In 1956, J. Nyerere visited Zanzibar several times, trying to convince Shirazi and the "Mainlanders" to forget about differences and come out with a united African front. However, the Shirazi of Pemba were politically distanced from mainland Africans and opposed the rapprochement of ASH with AAZ. The Pembah section of the Shirazi Association ignored the merger of the two organizations in 1957 and the formation of the Afro-Shirazi Union, which was renamed the Afro-Shirazi Party in the same year. At the unification conference, the Shirazi Association was represented mainly by Wahadima Unguji. Unlike wapemba, they showed a desire to cooperate with the "Mainlanders". With the establishment of the refinery, the Pembaa Section of AS joined it.

The REFINERY's electoral success was due, among other things, to the skillful use of hostility between representatives of the Shirazi and mainland African communities. Many Shirazi did not consider themselves African. They considered Zanzibar not as a part of Africa, but as a separate national and cultural body, close to the African continent only geographically. Arab leaders manipulated the image of mainland Africans as competitors in the labor market, as " unwelcome, uninvited guests who invaded the territory where Shirazi and Arabs have always lived in harmony." Oil refiners thus cultivated in Shirazi a sense of distance from the "Mainlanders" and a sense of closeness to Arab culture.

This tactic was especially successful among the Shirazi Pemba and Tumbatu, who were less close to the idea of pan-African unity, which overcomes various kinds of particularism, than the Shirazi Unguji. But it wasn't so much cultural arguments that worked, but the fact that the Pemba Shirazi were close to the Arabs in terms of socio-economic interests. The opposite attitude to" African " causes and makes natural the radically different positions of the two leading parties of Zanzibar on the issue of creating a Federation of East Africa. PASH supported the idea of an economic and political union of the countries of the region-with the formation of a single state. The refinery agreed only to a free form of association, with the broadest possible autonomy of the subjects of the association [Lofchie, 1965, p. 155-156].

Following the June 1961 elections, which were accompanied by mass clashes, the responsibility, as the British noted, should have been assigned to the oil refinery and the PASH equally, since the former used religion to attract voters, the latter used racialism, and both were engaged in "settling old scores". The colonialists, on the one hand, understood that these were "illegal practices", but at the same time they claimed that all three parties - the Oil Refinery, the ACP and the Oil Refinery-defended multi-racial unity in Zanzibar and sought to enlist the support of all the communities inhabiting the archipelago. The British stated that the Nationalist Party of Zanzibar achieved the greatest success in achieving these goals due to more effective work with voters and greater financial opportunities [Zanzibar.., 1965, p. 25-26, 31]. This recognition is not accidental: the pro-Sultan party of the Arab oligarchy of the Oil Refinery owed its powerful administrative resource and dominance in power structures to the colonialists, who, by granting preferences to the Arab elite, sought to maintain their influence in Zanzibar.

Both the refinery and its main political opponent, PASH, used an appeal to cultural nationalism in their activities. Islam in the ideology of the oil Refinery acted as a unifying symbol for Zanzibar Muslims of different racial backgrounds, and helped justify the status of Arabs as the elite, the dominant force in society. In the ideology of the PASH, race served to explain the economic, class contradictions in Zanzibar, and religion and politics were separated from each other. The party struggle in the archipelago can be mistaken for an inter-tribal or inter-racial conflict, but the composition of the opposing forces did not fit strictly into the scheme of "Arabs versus Africans" or "Africans versus Arabs". Economic factors were more effective than cultural ones.

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On the eve of the revolution, the refinery was supported by Arabs, Wapemba, Watumbatu, as well as Muslim Indians; for PASH-Wahadima, Africans from the mainland, and Hindu Indians. Having once again won the majority of votes in the elections (in 1963 - 54%), PASH was not allowed to take power, which became possible in accordance with the electoral system adopted in Zanzibar, the principles of dividing electoral districts and allocating seats in parliament. As a result, with the support of the majority of Zanzibaris, the PASH did not win a majority in the Legislative Council. In 1963, the Government of internal Self-Government was again headed by a coalition of oil refineries and oil refineries-parties, each of which individually received fewer votes in the elections than the PASH.

Afro-Shirazi activists were outraged by discrimination in land relations, education and employment. When applying for administrative positions, they argued, preference was given to Arabs rather than Africans; the archipelago was not "Zanzibarianized" but "Arabized." Karume argued that the majority should govern, since this is democracy, and only an African government can satisfy the African majority of the island's population (Mosare, 1969, p. 233-234). On the issue of land distribution and "Zanzibarization" of the civil service bodies, the positions of the PASH and the refinery radically diverged. The PASHA demanded the redistribution of some of the fertile land in favor of Africans and their wider involvement in high government positions. The refinery saw racism in such methods of "equalizing opportunities". In turn, by appealing to non-racial principles in its policy, the refinery actually consolidated and reproduced the already existing socio-economic inequality and left in force the initially best starting conditions for Arabs, which developed over a century of the Sultan's regime in Zanzibar. PASH proposed breaking this "vicious circle" by introducing temporary preferences for Africans.

ON THE EVE OF THE "AFRICAN" REVOLUTION

In December 1963, Britain granted independence to the protectorate of Zanzibar; it was not formally considered a colony. The Sultanate received a constitution. The leading political force on the islands was the pro-self-determination oil refinery, whose leadership was dominated by Arabs. The refinery operated in alliance with the refineries. Independence was preceded by an agreement reached in September 1963 at the constitutional conference in London that Britain would grant independence to the archipelago, provided that power remained in the hands of the Sultan as a constitutional monarch and Zanzibar joined the Commonwealth of Nations [Shlenskaya, 2014, p. 55]. Such steps kept the British presence on the domestic political scene of Zanzibar.

The British, who considered themselves responsible for the future fate of the former dependent territories, believed that Zanzibar, through their efforts, approached sovereign statehood in a relatively prosperous socio-economic and political state. They saw the Sultan's dynasty as a "unifying symbol for the peoples of Zanzibar". While acknowledging the archipelago's close "historical and ethnic" ties to the mainland, the British also noted the differences between them. On the contrary, the colonialists themselves presented the situation on the islands (and tried to convince the world community of this) in such a way that the multi-racial (Arab, African and Afro-Shirazi) population of Zanzibar, located at different levels of social, economic and political development, seeks to "forge a single nation" despite the differences that divided Zanzibarians in the past [Zanzibar.., 1963, p. 1, 23].

In fact, these differences, which gave rise to conflicts, were the result of British policy itself. The colonialists established and used cultural boundaries to control the population of the territories under their control. According to the British, the differences between the Zanzibari people did not prevent the creation of a Zanzibar nation, while the dissimilarity between the population of the archipelago and the mainland served as an obstacle to the political union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika [Turinskaya, 2014, p.62].

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After the January 1964 revolution in Zanzibar, power passed to the PASH, which supported the idea of unification with Tanganyika, collaborated with the TANU and enjoyed the support of its leader, J. R. R. Tolkien. Nyerere. From the point of view of the social composition of the supporters of the opposing parties, the mainstay of the oil refinery-oil refinery coalition is the Arab aristocrats, medium and small landowners, employees, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, as well as some small landowners - Shirazi. The social base of the Pashas was made up of "mainland" Africans-urban and rural wage workers, entrepreneurs, and Shirazi peasants.

The ideology of the revolution reflected the complex and contradictory nature of the socio-political situation in the archipelago. Thus, Babu, who was born in Zanzibar to an Arab-Comorian family, went from sympathizing with the refinery program to working with the PASH. When Babu founded the Umma (People) party in 1963, which represented the "non-racial" or"multi-racial" direction of the revolution, he dreamed of the victory of socialism in the archipelago [Wilson, 2007, p.11]. Another key actor in the armed uprising, whose name was long erased from the history of the Zanzibar revolution, was Ugandan John Okello. Class and race hostility were combined in his views. He was convinced that forcing the Arabs to give up power and leave the islands was possible only by force, and not by negotiation. Okello saw the revolution as a step towards pan-African unity and a radical means of ridding Zanzibar of the sultan's rule, which together with the Arab minority oppressed Africans [Okello, 1973, pp. 108-109, 195-197].

Cultural and ideological arguments were used to explain the reasons for the unification of the archipelago with the mainland. In the struggle for Zanzibar, his "Africanism"was interpreted in various ways. The US feared that China, the GDR and other socialist countries were trying to turn Zanzibar into a "non-African state" in order to use it in their political maneuvers on the African continent. Karume saw the United States ' position as an attempt to sow conflict between Zanzibar and East Africa. However, he himself saw a rival in the Umma party - "more Arab than African", whose leadership was dominated by Arabs and Comorans, and removed it from the "political field" of Zanzibar. Shortly after the revolution, in March 1964, Karume banned all parties in the islands, and the PAH remained the only legally active political organization [Ayany, 1977, p. 142].

The result of the government's pro-Arab policy was a total and radical change in the political situation. Ideological contradictions within the parties have become more acute. As a result of another split, the Umma party was separated from the oil refinery. The United Front of the Opposition was formed; on the eve of the armed uprising of January 1964, the Umma agreed to coordinate its actions with the Pasha [Ovchinnikov, 1986, pp. 168-169]. The direct perpetrators of the coup were activists of the PASH Youth League under the command of J. R. R. Tolkien. Okello.

Obviously, the racialization of the socio-political discourse, the space of everyday life of Zanzibaris and the sphere of public administration could not but exacerbate the conflict. The result of the struggle for liberation from British colonial rule - Zanzibar's independence - was perceived by Africans as"independence for the Arabs". This led to the "African" social revolution, which aimed to eliminate "Arab colonialism", economic inequality, the creation of an" African " state and an egalitarian society in Zanzibar. The 1964 uprising, the overthrow of the Sultan, and the elimination of Arab power structures in the archipelago were accompanied by violence and repression based on class and race. Thousands of Arabs were expelled from the country, deprived of their property and forced to emigrate to the mainland or to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Frightened by the massacres, Zanzibar Indians also left the islands en masse. Later, the Comorans were also expelled from the archipelago, who, like the Arabs and Indians, were denied the right to be considered Zanzibaris.

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The number of people killed and injured is unknown, and there are no exact statistics on emigration from the islands. Due to the dynamics of the political situation, the identity of Zanzibaris changed: many residents of the archipelago, who previously called themselves Arabs or Shirazi, but "if only not Africans", after the revolution began to call themselves Africans. According to S. Ayani, previously "a black person, but at least with a particle of Arab blood, called himself an Arab." Identifying and registering as an Arab or Shirazi was a matter of survival and social growth. After the revolution, everything changed: "being black became safe and prestigious" (Ayany, 1977, p. 16).

M. A. Bakari noted that the residents of Zanzibar changed their identity "like gloves" (lit. "like shirts") in different periods of time (Bakari, 2001, p. 71). Thus, we should not discount situational and multiple identities, arbitrary attribution and self-attribution in connection with momentary interests. These factors play an important role in political processes and in the struggle of groups for access to resources. Since 1970, a campaign was launched in Zanzibar against the use of the term" Shirazi", which, according to Karume, was intended to smooth out the differences between the inhabitants of the islands and eliminate the ground for distrust of" indigenous "people in relation to people from the mainland -" watu wa bara " (Teterin, 2012, p.856).

The Declaration of March 8, 1964 proclaimed Zanzibar's transition to a non-capitalist path of development. In the archipelago, large-scale land ownership was eliminated, land was nationalized and redistributed from Arab owners in favor of African tenants and state farms. The production and sale of cloves, as well as other sectors of the economy, came under state control. Having come to power as a result of the elimination of the Arab elite, which supported the sultan under the slogans of Islam and followed the course of cooperation with the countries of the Arab world in foreign policy, the new revolutionary leaders of Zanzibar defiantly rejected "Arabism". The constitutional monarchy and multiparty system were replaced by the dictatorship of the Revolutionary Council and the one-party system. The authoritarian ruler Sheikh A. A. Karume, while establishing a new regime in the archipelago and supporting the general trend of "Africanization" of social and political life throughout Tanzania, at the same time sought to distance himself from the "mainland" and preserve the maximum possible autonomy of the Zanzibar regional community within the union.

* * *

Thus, the positioning of Zanzibar as an Arab state was expressed in the system of social hierarchy and institutionalized inequality along cultural lines, in the racialist orders that the British established. The juxtaposition of "Arab" to "African", accompanied by discriminatory practices, led to an aggravation of inter - communal discord in the archipelago, and after the revolution, it hindered unification processes in the newly formed union state of Tanzania.

At present, with the introduction of multi - party system and in the face of the confrontation between the two leading parties in Zanzibar-CHM and GDF, the idea that Babu developed is still relevant. The search for a "third force" that could balance the contradictions in the archipelago continues. Such a position in the Zanzibar society could not be occupied by either oil refineries or Umma. In the mid-2000s, the Safina group and then the Jahazi Asilia party were considered an alternative to the CHM and GOF, which also failed to achieve any significant place in the political space of Zanzibar. The leaders of this organization - dissenters from the ranks of the ruling CHM cannot forgive Abeid Karuma for allegedly "selling" Zanzibar to Tanganyika. They are driven by dissatisfaction with the existing principles of the union state, which, in their opinion, negated the achievements of the Zanzibar revolution, leveled the Zanzibar revolution.

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identity has engulfed the Zanzibar nation [Maoulidi, 2011]. The weak popularity of Jahazi Asilia is explained by the fact that the political niche that the party was trying to occupy - and this is, in fact, another version of Zanzibar nationalism, built on criticism of the union, nostalgia for the past and attempts to regain Zanzibar's lost sovereignty - is occupied by the Civil United Front.

However, the recent cooperation between the GOF and the Zanzibar branch of the CHM seems to be a pragmatic step in view of the opening prospects of changing the structure of the state towards federalism and greater autonomy of the archipelago, creating an independent economy on the islands and the possibility for local political elites to participate in the "resource pie" section in the event of the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves off the coast of Zanzibar [Taking the Spice.. , 2009]. The legacy of the revolution and the fate of the union have become a political bargaining chip in Tanzania and part of realpolitik.

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