Libmonster ID: KE-1288
Author(s) of the publication: V. A. USOV

Organization of African Unity Keywords:African UnionPan-African Parliament

On July 8-9, 2002, the 38th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Durban, South Africa, officially proclaimed the establishment of its successor, the African Union (AU). The reorganization was not accidental: by the end of the 1990s, the OAU had become a kind of" club of African presidents", which had little influence on the processes taking place in Africa, and began to depend excessively on the leading countries of the West, the European Union and the World Bank in its activities.

African leaders were aware that they could not prevent this process alone. Under these circumstances, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi proposed the creation of the African Union at the 1999 OAU summit in Algeria. In September 1999, at the invitation of Gaddafi, the leaders of African States gathered at the OAU Emergency Summit in Sirte, Libya, and decided to transform the OAU into the African Union1.

AU TASKS

A comprehensive plan for the reform of the OAU, in which the African "heavyweights" - South Africa and Nigeria-actively participated, was finalized by the end of 2001. Gradually, all the countries of the continent became members of the AU, with the exception of Morocco, which left the OAU in 1984 after accepting the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) as a member of this organization.

To some extent, the model for the AU was the structure of the European Union, the basic principle of which was the economic integration of its member countries. While they believed that Africa "should not reinvent the wheel", the continent's leaders also believed that the AU should preserve its African identity in its activities.2 In addition, unlike the overly politicized OAU, the new organization was primarily focused on creating conditions for more effective economic cooperation between the countries of the continent. 3

Another important area of activity of the AU, as emphasized in the text of the Founding Act of the Association, remains the protection of the"sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member States"4. This point is of particular importance for Africa, since the borders of many states on the continent were established during its division by European powers without taking into account the ethnic factor and even natural borders, such as rivers and mountains. Often drawn along parallels and meridians, these boundaries artificially divided individual tribes and ethnic groups. Moreover, many sections of the borders are still not demarcated, which, in the case of the discovery of mineral deposits, especially in the border areas, often becomes a reason for the emergence of territorial disputes, conflicts and separatist actions.

Among its most important tasks, the new Union declared "promoting the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent"5. Moreover, it is not so much about collective actions in the event of external aggression, as was the case during the existence of the OAU, but rather about preventing the threat of destabilization of the situation in certain regions.

At the same time, unlike the provisions of the OAU Charter, a number of fundamentally new points of a political nature were introduced in the Founding Act of the African Union. The document refers not only to "sovereign equality", but also to the "interdependence" of the AU member States. African leaders took an important step towards implementing collective action to maintain stability, fixing the right of each member of the organization to ask the Union to intervene in the conflict to "restore peace and security"6.

Moreover, Article 4 of the document grants the AU - with the consent of 2/3 of its members-the right to intervene in a Member State in the event of an emergency: armed conflict, genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.7 The Constituent Act (Article 30) contains provisions condemning the unconstitutional change of power in a particular country and preventing representatives of Governments that came to power in this way from participating in the work of the AU.8

A fundamentally new provision has become the possibility of introducing sanctions against not only defaulters, but also those who are not paying taxes, by the decision of the Assembly of the AU.-

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member States of the Union whose actions are contrary to the policy of the AU and do not comply with its decisions 9.

The supreme body of the AU is the Assembly of Heads of State. The Pan-African Parliament and the African Court of Human and Peoples ' Rights also operate under the auspices of the African Union. 7 specialized technical committees of the Union, as well as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, the African Investment Bank and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) economic program are designed to promote economic integration.

NEPAD

The large-scale program of the economic development strategy of the countries of the continent, NEPAD, was approved in 2001 at the OAU summit in Lusaka. It is based on a kind of informal agreement concluded by African leaders with representatives of global financial institutions and major developed countries of the world. The multibillion-dollar funding package, which will be implemented primarily by the World Bank (WB), was expected to target those African countries that implement democratic reforms and create a favorable investment climate. 10

However, NEPAD is not only a written program, but also a kind of organizational structure, which until recently functioned almost completely independently of the OAU, and then of the AU. NEPAD is chaired by the Programme Implementation Committee, which is elected on the basis of equal geographical representation of the African subregions. It includes representatives of the five countries that initiated the program - Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, as well as Tunisia, Mali, Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Rwanda, Botswana and Mozambique. The special Representatives of the Presidents of the initiating countries form another body , the Steering Committee, whose tasks include developing conditions for the formation of specific working projects and overseeing the activities of the NEPAD secretariat.11

The program sets out the tasks that have been repeatedly voiced at various international forums on Africa. The long-term goal is to accelerate the pace of development of the continent's countries and fully integrate them into the global economic and political system. To this end, when NEPAD was created, it was planned to ensure that the continent's GDP growth rate would reach 7% per annum over the next 15 years12.

However, the implementation of the goals set out in the NEPAD documents is slow, and the program is criticized, in particular, by Africans themselves. According to Senegalese President A. Wade, one of the founders of NEPAD, who later became its critic, the program threatens to subordinate Africa to Western political and economic influence.13 So, he figuratively called it "a beautiful Mercedes with a bad driver" 14.

Hopes that NEPAD will become a generator of investment in the African economy have not yet been fulfilled. For example, the head of the multibillion-dollar development program for the Zambezi River Valley, a prominent state and political figure in Mozambique, S. Vieira said this about NEPAD: "They only have seminars and seminars..." 15.

In addition, some African leaders remain suspicious that NEPAD will serve the interests of large African countries with "high international ratings", such as South Africa. The support provided to NEPAD by the Group of Eight and a number of key provisions of this program, which, according to its critics, directly "encroach" on the principles of sovereignty of independent African States, also cause a negative reaction from some African politicians.

In addition, soon after the creation of the program, it became clear that the existence of NEPAD and the OAU (later the AU) as two de facto alternative African initiatives, it not only made no practical sense, but also weakened the very idea of African integration. As a result, it was decided to formalize relations between these organizations. In 2002, the NEPAD secretariat, based in Midrand, South Africa, was granted the temporary status of an AU office outside its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for a period of three years. At the end of the same three years (or earlier) It was intended to fully integrate NEPAD into the African Union.16

In 2009, the new Executive Secretary of NEPAD was Ibrahim Mayaki, a former Prime Minister of Niger (1997-2000) with extensive political and managerial experience. Mayaki's first steps in the new post have already confirmed his desire to implement the unification of NEPAD and the AU. The NEPAD secretariat was renamed the Planning and Coordination Agency, which was expected to gradually evolve into the "public African think-tank.17

The formation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) envisaged by the NEPAD program is not proceeding very quickly. Only 14 AU member countries have established special national structures to assess the implementation of commitments made by African States under the programme, and only 10 of them - Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and Uganda-have already implemented the relevant measures. checks 18.

PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

Political conflicts and wars in African countries

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countries at the end of the last century and the beginning of this century forced the AU leaders to make adjustments to the original structure of the organization.

Already at the Durban summit of the Union in June 2002, an agreement was reached on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (SMB). The AU Secretary-General was instructed to determine the structure, procedures and working methods of the new body.19 In February 2003, the regular summit in Addis Ababa adopted a number of amendments that provided, inter alia, for the AU's right to intervene - on the recommendation of the SMB - in the internal affairs of Member States in the event of a threat to the legitimate Government there, as well as to restore peace and stability in the region.20

The SMB was supposed to become the "African" equivalent of the UN Security Council and act together with other international organizations as part of the global security system.

The so-called Panel of Wise was created as an advisory body to the SMB, which consists of 5 members representing various regions of Africa and who have made "outstanding contributions to strengthening peace, security and development of the continent"21. As was the case with other AU bodies, its creation was delayed, and the first meeting of the Council of Europe was held on the basis of the it took place only in December 2007. Its current members include former OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzania), first President of Algeria Ahmed Ben Bella, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin Elisabeth Ponyon, former President of Sao Tome and Principe Miguel Travoada and Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa Brigalia Bamako.

In order to monitor and resolve the situation, the African Union decided to establish a continent - wide early warning system for conflicts and, in particular, an African Permanent Readiness Force (AFF) capable of rapid mobilization for various peacekeeping tasks. 23 A "situation room" operates around the clock at the AU headquarters; in addition, a Committee of Security and Intelligence Services has been established under the auspices of the organization.

The SMB has the authority to take measures to prevent conflicts, resort to peacekeeping actions in case of their occurrence, impose sanctions against States where an unconstitutional change of power has occurred, assist in strengthening democratic procedures, the rule of law and the rule of law, and provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population.24

At the suggestion of Muammar Gaddafi, at the first AU summit in Durban in 2002, the Assembly adopted a resolution on the creation of the Pan-African armed forces and determined that, along with the national oath, members of the armies of the AU member countries should take the oath of allegiance to the AU as such.25 The prototype of the common African army is designed to be the ASPG 26. Countries that contribute troops to the African Armed Forces are required to maintain them for six months.27 Further funding will be provided by the Peace Foundation 28 specially created within the AU.

It was assumed that the ASPG would consist of five brigades with a total number of 20 thousand people, stationed respectively in the northern, southern, eastern, western and central regions of Africa. In 2006, their headquarters, located in Addis Abebe29, became operational. In 2007, the southern ("SADC brigade") and eastern brigades were formed, and similar units are currently being established in West and Central Africa, but this process is being delayed in the north of the continent due to difficulties in relations between the States of the region.30

Meanwhile, the practical implementation of the AU's efforts in the field of security on the continent has been the peacekeeping operations organized under the auspices of the Union, two of which were carried out in the most "hot spots" in Africa - in the Sudanese province of Darfur and in Somalia.

The AU peacekeeping Operation in Darfur (AMIS - African Mission in Darfur) began in 2004. Initially, a 7,000-strong Union contingent was deployed in the province, including military and police units from various African States, mainly from Nigeria, Kenya and Rwanda. 31 The AU force was later transformed into a joint AU-UN - UNAMID hybrid mission. Since 1 January 2010, Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) has been appointed Head of Mission and Special Representative, Henry Anyidoho (Ghana) as his Deputy, Mohammed Younis (Somalia) as his Deputy for Management and Operations, General Patrick Nyamwumba (Rwanda) as the Commander of the military contingent, and Michael Freer (South Africa)as the Police Officer .32

The deployment of a" hybrid " peacekeeping force in Darfur is facing great challenges due to the pre-deployment of a hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur.-

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Most notably, the mission's budget exceeded $1.7 billion in 2008 and 2009, making it one of the most expensive peacekeeping operations in the history of the organization. 33 In addition, the Government of the Sudan is committed to maintaining the predominantly African composition of UNAMID and is very selective in accepting non-African countries to participate in the mission.34

By the beginning of 2010, there were 19,588 peacekeepers stationed in Darfur, mostly from African and other developing countries: 14,681 military personnel, 271 military observers,and 4,636 military policemen. 35

Another" hot spot " on the map of Africa is Somalia, on which the world's media attention was once again focused in 2006, when a real possibility of radical Islamist forces coming to power was outlined in this country. Ethiopia's open entry into the Somali civil war in 2006 on the side of the largely dysfunctional Transitional Government against the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts radically changed the balance of power not only in Somalia, but also in the Horn of Africa as a whole.

Ethiopia and Somalia have developed quite complex relations. Somalis still remember their military defeat in the conflict with Ethiopia in 1977-1978. Therefore, the entry of Ethiopian troops into Somalia could not lead to the strengthening of the Transitional Government's position, and in 2009, when this became apparent, Ethiopia withdrew its contingent from neighboring territory.36 Initially, it was assumed that they would soon be replaced by AU forces totaling up to 8 thousand. However, as of January 2010, the African Union Mission in Somalia (ANISOM) consisted of three battalions from Uganda and one from Burundi, totaling 5,268 soldiers and officers.37

It should be noted that after the withdrawal of the Ethiopian army units, the Islamists regained control over a large part of the territory of Somalia; in the capital, Mogadishu, attacks on government patrols, AU peacekeepers and their locations also did not stop. The flow of refugees from the country is constantly increasing 38.

The failure of the African Union to address the problems of Darfur and Somalia, in particular the inability to conduct effective peacekeeping operations on its own, has shown that the continent's countries are not yet ready to play a major role in the conflict resolution process.

Perhaps the only successful military operation carried out by the AU armed contingent was conducted in March 2008 on the island of Anjouan (Comoros) and directed against local separatists, but many African leaders considered it "unnecessary", since it was already moving towards a political settlement of the conflict.39

At the same time, it would be wrong to talk about the failure of the AU's peacekeeping missions. Although the Union was forced to agree to the " internationalization "of the process of resolving the conflicts mentioned above, in particular the" inclusion " of the UN, as happened in Darfur, it was African military personnel who made up the largest part of peacekeeping units, African officers developed the strategy and tactics of operations, and African politicians formulated the tasks and goals of peacekeeping missions.

AU COMMISSION

The supreme executive body of the Union is the AU Commission, consisting of the Chairman, his deputies and commissars, for whose assistance a special bureaucratic apparatus has been created.40

The first Chairman of the Commission, in 2003, was a representative of Mali (former President of the European Commission).

page 24

president of the country) Alpha Omar Konare 41. It was decided that the Commission will consist of 10 people, two from each African region. In addition to Konare, the first committee consisted of the Vice-Chairman and 8 members of the Commission (commissioners), including five women.42 Among the tasks of the Chairman of the Commission, almost the main one was to solve the issues of financing the activities of the AU, because despite the loud statements of the leaders of the member countries, they were in no hurry to take on the burden of paying contributions to the budget of the African Union.

There was also a question of giving this body powers similar to those of the European Commission. The new head of the AU Commission, from 28 April 2008, was the representative of Gabon, Jean Ping, 43 who previously served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Gabon.44

Erastus Jarnalese Onkundi Mwencha, a Kenyan who served as General Secretary of COMESA, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa45, was elected as his Deputy. Of the remaining members of the commission, five were re-elected and three were re-elected. As before, the new Commission consists of five women.46

Repeated attempts to increase the importance of this body and actually turn it into a kind of "government" of the AU failed.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BODIES OF THE AU

To make the NPP structure more stable and reliable, the Union leaders decided to form representative and judicial authorities within the framework of the association. As a result, the inauguration ceremony of the All-African Parliament (UAP)was held in Addis Ababa on March 18, 200447.

Gertrude Mongella, a Tanzanian, was elected as the first Chair of the UAP, but she resigned after 5 years, and in 2009 Chadian Idriss Ndele Moussa became the new head of Parliament, with Bethel Amadi (Nigeria), Mary Mugyeni (Uganda), Larussi Hami (Algeria) and Joram Gumbo (Zimbabwe)as his deputies48.

The acquisition of the right of legislative initiative by the Pan-African Parliament has proved to be a more complex and slow process than expected when it was created, since giving the legislative body the appropriate powers implies direct election of members of Parliament by all able-bodied citizens of African States, and this remains an almost insoluble problem.

The 5-year deadline set in 2004 for assigning the functions of the legislative body of the AU to the Parliament and holding the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009 remained only on paper. Back in 2007, one of the highest - ranking officials of the AU, Samuel Efea Mbozo'o, suggested that the functioning of the Parliament as a legislative body could begin only in 2015, 49 And in the report on the prospects for the creation of the AU Government, prepared by the AU leaders and presented at the 9th session of the Union in July 2007, it was noted that the 2015 milestone is not realistic.

Apparently, the transformation of the Parliament into a competent and representative body of the AU is postponed indefinitely. As a result of this development, a vicious circle has formed: on the one hand, because of the inefficiency of the VAP's activities, African leaders do not want to increase its funding, on the other hand, lack of funds does not allow the VAP to perform even its limited advisory functions in full.

The situation with the AU judicial body remains even more uncertain. The protocol establishing the African Court of Human and Peoples ' Rights was signed in 1998, but it did not enter into force until January 2004, when 15 States ratified it. Meanwhile, in 2000, the formation of the AU special Court was announced, but this body did not start working on a permanent basis. In June 2004, the AU Summit decided to merge the two courts. In July 2008, the African Ministers of Justice formally approved the merger in the form of a "Protocol on the Status of the African Court of Justice for the Protection of Justice and Human Rights".50

One of the reasons for this decision, perhaps the most important, was the desire to ensure more or less adequate funding for the AU judicial body. The African Court of Justice was supposed to occupy the premises of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania, which was supposed to complete its work, but its mandate was extended until the end of 2009.51 It is likely to continue its work, at least on its information site activities are scheduled for the end of 2010.52 Thus, the deployment of the African Court of Justice remains questionable.

The delays in launching the functioning of AU bodies, which were voted for by the leaders of a large number of African countries, are caused not so much by problems with funding, logistics or bureaucratic delays, but rather by the fear of many African leaders to "tie their hands" and allow the multinational judicial body to interfere in the internal affairs of the State.

Expanding cooperation with the AU and other regional organizations in Africa is in Russia's interests, especially as generations of leaders are changing on the Black continent. Many of those who are "at the helm" in a number of African countries, were educated in the Soviet Union, know Russian and have good memories of their stay in our country. But this generation is gradually leaving. And among the younger generation, Russia is not associated either with assistance in the fight against colonialism and racism, or with cooperation in overcoming poverty. Challenges facing us today

page 25

African countries and their associations are primarily concerned with ensuring the security of socio-economic development, environmental degradation, and the fight against epidemics. Today, only assistance in addressing these issues can be highly appreciated in modern Africa.

* * *

It would be fair to assume that, as the successor to the OAU, the African Union is just beginning its activities. That is why its tasks, structure and functioning mechanisms are defined only in general terms. The problems of African unity and related initiatives (including the AU Founding Act itself) are well known only to a narrow circle of politicians, government officials and scientists, both in Africa and in other regions of the world. It will take a lot of time and effort to clarify the functions of the organization and address funding issues to the extent necessary for the AU bodies to carry out effective activities.

At the same time, the continent is represented primarily by the African Union in the international arena. Its chairmen are invited to attend the G8 and G20 summits, and regular meetings are held between representatives of the founding countries of NEPAD and personal representatives of the G8 leaders.

Despite some setbacks that characterize, in particular, the AU's peacekeeping activities and are caused by objective difficulties and subjective problems that the African Union faced in the first decade of the twenty-first century, its creation certainly meant a step forward in the development of the idea and practice of African integration, as well as in the development of a unified position by the continent's states in response to global challenges. challenges of our time.


1 Transition from the OAU to the African Union - www.dfa.gov.za/AU2002. P. 2.

2 Ibid, P. 5.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 4.

6 Ibidem.

7 Ibid.

8 Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 30.

9 Ibid. Article 23.

10 ITAR-TASS, 11.07.2002.

11 Background on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). P. 4.

Vasiliev A.M. 12 Africa and Challenges of the XXI century. Report at the IX Conference of African Studies. Moscow, May 21-23, 2002. Moscow, 2002, p. 8.

Harrison Kinyanjui, J. 13 Examining NEPAD's conceptual shortcomings // The East African, Nairobi, July 8, 2007 - http://trade-africa.blogspot.com/2007/07/examining-nepads-conceptual.html

14 http://allafrica.com/stories/200804141582.html

15 Conversation with S. Vieiro, Tete, August 23, 2008

16 Decisions and Declarations. Assembly of the African Union. Second Ordinary Session. 10 - 12 July 2003. Decl. 5 (II). P. 5 - 6.

17 The New NEPAD - http://www.nepad.org/News/sector_id/6/lang/en/news/90

18 United Nations General Assembly. A / 63. 130. New York, 2008.

19 Assembly of the African Union, First Ordinary Session: Decisions and Declarations. 9 - 10 July, 2002 - www.dfa.gov.za. P. 2 - 3.

20 Pulse of the planet. ITAR-TASS. 05.02.2003.

21 Ibid.

22 http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-12/2007 - 12 - 18-voa47.cfm?CFID=75434795&CFTOKEN-78752359

23 Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union - http://www.africa-unionorg/rule_prot

24 Ibidem.

25 Assembly of the African Union First Ordinary Session: Decisions and Declarations... - www.dfa.gov.za. P. 3 - 4.

26 Opening statement by HE President T.Mbeki, outgoing chairperson of the African Union, at the Second ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, Maputo, 10 July 2003 - www.au2003.gov.mz/speeches/mbek100703.htm

Gottschalk K. 27 African Union: first five years. Preliminary assessment. Report at the 11th Conference of Africanists, Moscow, 2008. p. 9.

28 Protocol Relating to The Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 5.

29 www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/17/eng20060117_235958.html

30 Interview at the SADC Secretariat, Gabarone, 25 September 2008; http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/General/Issues/V2 - 1-2008/3-Aneme-Girmachew. pdf

31 Sudan: AU to Double Peacekeeping Force in Darfur. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. April 29, 2005 -http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/04/mil-050429-irin05.htm

32 UNAMID Leadership - http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/leadership.shtml

33 African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur - http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html

34 S/RES/1769 (2007). Resolution 1769 (2007), adopted by the Security Council at its 5727th meeting, on 31 July 2007.

35 UNAMID Facts and Figures - http://www.un.org/en/peace-keeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml

36 Ethiopia helps Somalia after the withdrawal of troops - Ambassador to the Russian Federation. RIA Novosti March 17, 2009 - http://www.rian.ru/world/20090317/ 165176971.html

37 http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/AMISOM_P ARTNERS_SUPPORTS.htm

38 Violence out of Control, say Mogadishu Residents. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. February 20, 2007 - www.allAfrica.com/stories/printable/200702200316.html

39 http://www.allbusiness.com/government/elections-politics-cam-paigns/10594818 - 1.html

40 Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 20.

41 African Union Untitled Document - www.dfa.gov.za/AU2003.

42 Ibidem.

43 http://www.africa-union.0rg/root/UA/Newsletter/publication%2029%20April%2008.p df

44 http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/AUCleaders/AU%20commissioners%20fly er.pdf

45 http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/AUCleaders/AU%20commissioners/o20fly er.pdf

46 http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/African+Union+Commission

47 For the transformation of the OAU into the AU and the beginning of its activities, see Usov V. A. Ot panafrikanizma - k sozdaniyu Afrikanskogo Soyuz [From Panafricanism to the creation of the African Union]. 2002, No. 10; African Union: one year later // Asia and Africa today. 2004, N 1.

48 Pan-Africa Parliament - http://www.pan-african-parliament.org/AboutPAP_StructureofthePAP_Bureau.aspx

49 Ibidem.

50 African Union adopts the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights - http://www.interights.org/AfricanSingleProtocolAdopted/index.htm It should be noted that this title no longer mentions the "rights of peoples", which significantly distinguished the terminology of the AU from the usual Western rhetoric.

51 www.allafrica.com/stories/200810030427.html

52 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda - http://www.ictr.org/default.htm


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This article examines the phenomenon of the United States' involvement in operations aimed at eliminating foreign leaders, which has gained new resonance in connection with the high-profile events of 2025–2026—the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the death of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a result of an American-Israeli strike. Based on analysis of historical documents, expert assessments, and international-law norms, the evolution of the United States' approaches to the use of force for regime change is reconstructed. Special attention is paid to the contradiction between the official prohibition on political assassinations and the continuing practice of their use under new legal justifications.
6 days ago · From Kenya Online
This article examines the critical strategic question of whether Russia possesses the capability to destroy the United States with a nuclear first strike while successfully precluding a devastating retaliatory response. Based on analysis of open-source intelligence, strategic force postures, official statements, and expert commentary, this study deconstructs the technical, operational, and doctrinal dimensions of this question. Particular attention is devoted to the structure of Russian strategic forces, the capabilities of the US nuclear triad and early warning systems, the role of automatic retaliatory systems like "Perimeter," and the fundamental strategic stability paradigm that has defined US-Russian relations for decades.
7 days ago · From Kenya Online
This article provides a comprehensive examination of the Tomahawk cruise missile, one of the most versatile and widely used precision-guided weapons in the modern military arsenal. Based on analysis of official defense sources, historical combat records, and technical specifications, the article reconstructs the evolution, design, and strategic role of this weapon system. Particular attention is devoted to its guidance technology, combat history, recent modernization into Block V variants, and the geopolitical implications of its potential transfer to Ukraine.
7 days ago · From Kenya Online

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