Keywords: Mali, political development, coup, separatism, Tuareg

On 22 March 2012, a military group led by Captain Amadou Sanogo launched a military coup in the Republic of Mali, ousting President Amadou Toumani Toure from power. The apparent pointlessness of the"toy putsch" ¹, which took place a month before the elections scheduled for April, immediately raised questions about its true goals and masterminds.

The coup was a turning point in the chain of tragic events that preceded and followed it. The putschists accused the authorities of failing to deal with the Tuareg separatist movement and the collapse of the army. After the overthrow of the legitimate government, the situation was worsened by the military success of Tuareg rebels and the activation of Islamist groups, which have been doing well in the region for many years.

Undoubtedly, the Tuareg revolt2, ^the strengthening of Islamist groups, the general destabilization of the region as a result of the fall of the Libyan Jamahiriya, and a number of other circumstances played a significant role in such a negative development of events. But we should not lose sight of the processes that have taken place in Malian society over the past 20 years.

More recently, Western experts wrote that Mali "is a model of democracy for the whole of West Africa"³. The view was widely expressed that "Mali was favourably distinguished from other West African States by the democratic nature of its political system and the level of development of its civil society"⁴. According to a number of Russian researchers (A.M. Vasiliev, E. N. Korendyasov, V. R. Filippov, etc.), these estimates, however, are not all adequate ⁵.

The cobblestone thrown into the showcase of African democracy by Tuaregs, Islamists or anyone else, had previously been thrown in the dusty path of the Third Republic's ineffective solution to the problems of Mali's socio-economic and political development, inherited from the Moussa Traore era (1979 - 1985). After a brief digression into the events leading up to the 2013 elections, we will return to the issues at the root of the crisis.

BLOCKADE, JIHADISTS AND INTERVENTION

On March 22, 2012, military putschists seized the Presidential Palace, the State television building, and military barracks. The rebels created the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and the Revival of the State, headed by Captain A. Sanogo. Amadou Toumani Toure's regime was overthrown.

On 2 April, the member States of the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS) announced the immediate entry into force of diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions against Mali. Mali's membership in the African Union has been suspended. The World Bank and the African Development Bank have suspended financial assistance to the country. The United States has halved the amount ($140 million) that it transfers annually to Mali for development purposes.⁶

The rapid involvement of Islamists in the conflict, who have long been based in hard-to-reach areas of the Malian Sahara, did not come as a surprise to anyone. By April 2012, Tuaregs and Islamist groups close to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had captured the cities of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. In fact, half of Mali's territory has come under rebel control. Soon, the Islamists ousted the units of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) from the captured cities.

Various political forces, which at the first stage played a leading role, tried to find a way out of this situation. But the divergence of interests, the inability of the political elite to consolidate-

* First Republic-1960-1968, Second Republic-1992-2012

Even in the face of a catastrophe, the often ambivalent attitude of the international community and ECOWAS towards the putschists did not allow Malian society to develop and implement its own scenario for overcoming the crisis.

In April, a compromise was reached between the putschists and ECOWAS, as a result of which, in accordance with the Constitution, the President of the National Assembly (Parliament) Dioncounda Traore was appointed interim President. The agreement was the result of difficult negotiations, numerous consultations between the junta and representatives of West African countries, within the junta itself and political groups, and under great pressure from the UN, the African Union, and ECOWAS.

The military was forced to retreat into the shadows, but continued and continue to exert a noticeable influence on the authorities of the republic. In June 2012, members of a pro-coup demonstration attacked the presidential palace. Dioncunda Traore was injured and had to travel to France for medical treatment.

Meanwhile, in the north of the country, the initiative completely passed into the hands of Islamists, who defeated their former allies from the MNLA and established Sharia law in the areas they controlled. The media published articles about the destruction of mausoleums of Muslim saints included in the UNESCO list of World Cultural Heritage Sites, about amputations of the hands of criminals, about corporal punishment for violating Sharia law.

France has taken active action at the UN in connection with the situation in Mali. As a result, the UN adopted a resolution that provided for sending a peacekeeping mission to the country.

In August 2012, a Government of National Unity was established under the auspices of Dioncunda Traore. It was headed by Prime Minister Modibo Diarra, who worked for NASA for a long time. The Cabinet of Ministers included representatives of various political groups, including supporters of the coup, as well as one Tuareg minister.

Bamako in those days was like an anxious hive, every day various political and public organizations held numerous meetings, conferences, rallies; officials from the European Union, African countries, the United States, various parliamentary commissions and non-governmental organizations visited Mali.

Malian statehood was in ruins, the country's territorial integrity was in doubt, and hundreds of thousands of refugees were concentrated in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and southern Mali. The army virtually ceased to exist, was almost paralyzed. Crime was on the rise.

The Interim President was forced to agree to the deployment of ECOWAS peacekeepers to help restore the country's territorial integrity. Such a decision caused a flurry of criticism from junta supporters and a number of political groups, but in the stalemate in which Mali found itself at that moment, this may have been the only correct decision. Therefore, the talk about D. Traore's betrayal of the interests of Mali did not have sufficient grounds.

As interim president, he was forced to act quickly and decisively. However, the deployment of ECOWAS troops was delayed. Meanwhile, on September 1, 2012, Islamists took control of the town of Duentza in the Mopti region, which also threatened the southern regions of the country. The crisis culminated in the Islamist offensive in southern Mali on January 10, 2013, and the French armed intervention in Operation Serval, which began the next day.

In a very short time, the Islamists were driven out of all more or less large settlements. The French played their game with finesse, and Francois Hollande was hailed in Mali in February as the "liberator of the nation"⁷. However, the "victory day" was, as it turned out, particularly because of the events in May 2014, premature.

The format of this article does not allow for a more in-depth analysis of these events.

2013 ELECTIONS

In line with strong recommendations, the first round of presidential elections was scheduled for July 28, 2013, and this provoked lively criticism from political parties and the public. But France, the United States and their allies called for holding the elections as soon as possible. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a lengthy statement that the results of the elections should be recognized even if the course of the election campaign is accompanied by violations. This was done as part of the" road map " for overcoming the crisis, which the United States actively advocated.

France and the international community saw the elections as an important stage in the process of resolving the Malian crisis. The negative consequences of holding them in circumstances that were not conducive to the independent expression of the will of the Malian people were ignored.

During the first round of voting, many shortcomings and violations were noted, and the voter lists often turned out to be very useful.-

They were incomplete, which was not surprising because of the large-scale population movements from the northern regions of the country to the south. In Kidal, the elections were actually boycotted due to the lack of central authorities. No more than 10% of the members of the Malian diaspora (out of about 4 million) were able to vote in foreign representations of the state.

On 28 July 2013, at 6 p.m., all polling stations in Mali closed, with the exception of those where citizens who had come to vote were still waiting in line at the ballot boxes. At some polling stations, voting was extended to 8 hours.

During the second round, the activity of the electorate slightly decreased, but all participants in the presidential race noted an unprecedented level of turnout at the country's polling stations, which has not been observed in the last 20 years.

The number of candidates for the post of head of state was also unprecedented-27 people. Most of them did not stand a chance alongside such" heavyweights " in politics as former Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, former Finance Minister Soumaila Cisse and Dramane Dembele. The latter was nominated by the country's largest party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA). Unlike his older rivals, he did not have such a significant political baggage, but he also had clear advantages: youth, new ideas, remoteness from the "nomenclature", which can be attributed to the IBK (as Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was called in the country), and Sumaila Cisse.

The election was won by I. B. Keita, for whom it was already the third presidential campaign. He has extensive political experience: he has served as Prime Minister, President of the National Assembly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, worked as an ambassador to several African countries, was elected President of ADEMA, held responsible positions in international and public organizations, and since 2001 has been the permanent leader of the Unite for Mali party, which he founded. created it after breaking up with ADEMA. In 1999, he was elected Vice-President of the Socialist International.

Another" heavyweight " was Sumaila Cisse, who advanced to the second round and lost to I. B. Keita with a big gap. As a candidate from ADEM, he has already participated in the 2002 elections. Soon he created the Union for the Republic and Democracy party, from which he ran as a candidate in 2013.

I. B. Keita, who began his political career after the fall of Moussa Traore's regime in the team of the first president of the Third Republic, Alpha Oumar Konare, is a categorical opponent of the political and economic autonomy of the northern regions of Mali, but provides in his economic program for the creation of priority economic zones that will contribute to the development of the region.

S. Cisse actively positioned himself as a liberal and a supporter of the market economy. Immediately after the election, he announced that his party would be the leader of the Malian opposition, whose presence would benefit the country's development.

what's next?

You can indulge in self-congratulation as much as you want against the background of relatively successful elections, but the tasks set by history for the people of Mali and their political elite lie on a different plane.

The threat from the Islamists was averted with the help of the French army. The ease with which the French won this victory cannot but raise the question of why in other regions of the world, unlike Mali, the fight against Islamists is delayed for many years. Maybe here the threat from Islamists was inflated with certain goals?

In recent years, the Sahel zone has become an arena for the clash of interests of world players, among which, in addition to France, the United States, Qatar, Iran and others have appeared. The use of internal socio-political problems of the region by external actors as a tool for manipulating the situation to achieve their goals cannot be excluded ⁸.

The formal obstacle to rebuilding the country - the absence of a legally elected president - no longer exists. Questions have emerged that will leave the revival of Malian statehood unanswered.

The Malian political elite must decide on the goals and objectives that lie before it and the country as a whole. The trivial phrase that one who does not know the past has no future becomes more relevant than ever.

Will the new President find the courage and will to assess the processes that have taken place in Malian society since 1991, will the Malian political elite want to understand the origins of the current crisis, will Malian intellectuals be able to analyze the causes of such a deep crisis that has affected Malian society, and offer an effective model for the country's development?

Immediately after the elections, the topic of national reconciliation, which implies a consensus of political forces, was actively discussed. In many respects, the further development of the situation will depend precisely on external factors, since in the conditions of partial loss of sovereignty, one should not expect active actions from the Malian side that can prevent the implementation of scenarios based on-

linked to the country by other countries.

What is unique about the current situation in the republic is that the forces that came to power as a result of the elections are an old generation of Malian politicians, successfully integrated into the system created in the country after 1991. Are they able to suggest ways out of the crisis and reflect on the mistakes that led to its emergence?

The intervention of the international community saved Mali from certain destruction, but it did not cure the diseases that almost destroyed the country. Prescriptions written out by Malian friends from the North had already collapsed two years ago. And the story will continue to unfold in the same vein if, after a while, the praises of a restored model of democracy that endear the Malian political class will once again plunge the country into the state of lethargy from which it was brought by the events of 2012.

This conscious lethargy of the authorities, who want to get their place under the sun of the values of the golden billion, even if not quite under the sun, but at least in its shadow, opens up unlimited opportunities for external manipulation of the country's political elite. The awareness of this approach can not cause any doubt, because who but Africans know about the good intentions of the former metropolises?

In September 2013, a banking official named Umar Tatam Lee, who has no political background but has achieved a high position in ECOWAS banking structures, was appointed to the post of Prime Minister. Being a highly qualified manager, W. T. Lee is not associated with any political groups, which, in our opinion, played a significant role in his appointment. However, his cabinet includes well-known long-serving politicians: Defense Minister Sumaila Bubei Maiga and Colonel Sada Samake, who was appointed head of the Security Ministry. Overall, at least 15 ministers held senior positions under previous regimes.

As expected, the largest number of portfolios were given to representatives of the Unite for Mali party, two posts - to representatives of the ex-junta and the same number - to ADEM. Many political parties and associations that supported I. B. Keita in the 2013 elections were left without representation in the Government. However, even if we are not talking about dividing the pie, the question arises, how can such a poor country afford the luxury of having a 34-member government?⁹

The correspondence of the Malian political system to the formal letter of democracy allows Western countries to manipulate the public opinion of their countries, ranting about gratuitous assistance to African friends, covering up shameless and unfair methods of economic domination. The neoliberal experiments that swept across our planet like a devastating whirlwind and brought a lot of grief to millions of people around the world have not spared Mali.

Here is what the famous Egyptian economist Samir Amir writes about this: "Analysts, whose minds have not been freed from racist prejudices, are in a hurry to conclude that the African peoples are not ripe for democracy. It deliberately ignores the fact that the victory of the Malian people coincided with a "neoliberal" offensive, generating social regression and an economy of unlimited pauperization, which imposed a model on an extremely fragile country... the development agenda promoted by the World Bank and supported by Europe and France " ¹⁰.

Economic and political prescriptions, presented as a panacea for long-standing African problems, in practice turned out to be nothing more than a tool for consolidating economic dependence on the former metropolis, and contributed to the further degradation of Malian society.

If the main political function of elections is not only to give someone power, but also to form a certain balance of power in the political arena as a whole, then everything is fine with this point in Mali, but will the emerging balance of power play any significant role in shaping a new project for the development of Mali? Are there any new and reliable politicians on the Malian political Olympus?

These questions will be answered in the near future.

^{Filippov V. R.} 1 The war in Mali: the shadow of the Elysee Palace // International life. 2013, N 4, с. 45. (Philippov V.R. Voina v Mali: ten Eliseiskogo dvortsa // Megdunarodnaya zhizn. 2013, N 4).

² See Filippov V. R. Tuaregs of Mali: the Long Road to Peace / / Asia and Africa Today. 2012, N 7, 9. (Philippov V.R. Tuaregi Mali: dolgiy put k miru // Azia i Afrika segodnya. 2012, N 7, 9)

^{Rivera J. - F.} 3 Elections au Mali: lecon democratique - http://translate.google.ru/translate?hl=ru&langpair-frru&u=http://www.cafebabel.fr/article/20 731/elections-au-mali-lecon-democratique.html

^{Bingen R.J., Staatz J.M., Robinson D.} 4 Democracy and Development in Mali. The Michigan State University Press, 2000.

^{Filippov V. R.} 5 Elections in Mali: what to hope for and what to fear? // Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 3, с. 35. (Philippov V.R. Vybory v Mali: na chto nadeyatsva i chego opasatsya? // Azia i Afrika segodnya. 2012, N 3).

^{Engdahl F. U.} 6 The War in Mali and the AFRICOM Plan: Target-China - http://www.warandpeace.ru/ru/exclusive/view/77422/#.US0XvPMCMI.email

⁷ Ibidem.

^{Meyssan T.} 8 Mali: une guerre peut en cacher une autre - http://www.voltairenet.org/article177179.html

⁹ http://www.maliweb.net/news/politique/2013/09/02/article.167161.html

^{Amin S.} 10 Mali: le projet francais, au service de quels interets? - http://www.afrique-asie.fr/component/content/article/70-points-chauds/4910-mali-le-projet-fr ancais-au-service-de-quels-interets.html

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